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I. INTRODUCTION   
The United States Department of Defense is itching for change.  The signs of this 
unease are numerous.  There exists a newly created Department of Defense Office of 
Force Transformation.  The United States Navy has established an “Outliers” work group 
for unconventional strategic thinkers.  Rumors of a Revolution in Military Affairs rush 
around the hallways of the Pentagon and retired officers write books about The Future of 
Warfare.  The United States Army has transferred their energies to Force XXI and the 
United States Navy redesigns a new class of ship and a new class of submarine almost 
every year.  This itch for change could be a sign of the times; times where information 
technology develops a generation in a year and a half and computers over five years old 
are antiquated.  On the civilian side of the world, bookstores are littered with non-fiction 
entitled Leading Change, The Change Management Toolkit, Managing Transitions: 
Making the Most of Change and Leading in a Culture of Change.  Clearly, change is in. 
McKinsey analysts Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan claim that businesses that 
fail to embrace change and fail to evolve with current markets are doomed to failure.1  
Similarly, a military that fails to innovate when their contemporaries are innovating is 
doomed.  So the quest for change within militaries is a rational and hopefully encouraged 
behavior.  This thesis will look at how different militaries approach change and evaluate 
their successes and failures.  If it is true that change is the only constant, then it makes 
sense to have the most effective changes possible. 
Businesses today describe innovation as a multi-faceted organism, and perhaps a 
bit too broadly, allowing the term to be applied to “new distribution systems, customer 
service, marketing or financial services”, according to Joyce Wycoff, founder and 
executive director of the Innovation Network.2  Each of these innovations can be tweaked 
on a daily basis in the open market to maximize profit potential.  In militaries, innovation 
is more constrained.  Unlike most businesses, a military’s strategy, operations and tactics 
are rarely tested in open battle.  This means that while businesses compete every day to 
                                                 
1 Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 
2001) 14. 
2 Joyce Wycoff, “Defining Innovation,” ON Business 1 January 2001 
http://www.onbusiness.net/articles_html/JoyceWycoff_224.html (25 May 2002). 
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make a profit, militaries must wait for an international conflict to fine-tune their strategies 
and see if they work outside of limited exercises. 
The military philosopher Friedrich von Bernhardi claims that each war and every 
military conflict has its own distinct characteristics and that it is vital to understand as 
many ramifications surrounding the conflict as possible.  While it is important to study 
recent military history and learn from successes and mistakes made in the past, one can 
rest assured that the next conflict will not be the same as the previous conflict.3  Since the 
nature of war is always changing, it is important to look ahead towards new 
developments and create new ideas and principles according to modern requirements.  
According to von Bernhardi, the factors that contribute to military superiority are 
numerous: strategic, tactical, quality of commander, numerical advantage, changes in 
technology and correct application of those changes are all contributors.  It is important 
for a military to advance with the changes instead of staying in the past. 
There are, according to Von Bernhardi, a few constants in the nature of war.  The 
object of war is always to impose one’s will upon the enemy and militaries can act either 
offensively or defensively to do so.  The human factor will always play a role in warfare 
and individuals or groups can be manipulated to influence the course of war.  Other than 
those few broad constants, warfare is a constantly changing art.  It becomes dangerous to 
create rules of war from previous battles as opposed to general lessons of war.  History is 
always seen through a filter that is biased with the opinions of the victors and historians 
of the times.  So the best militaries can do is make educated guesses during the 
intermediary periods as to what may or may not be successful in future conflicts.4 
The options open to militaries to evolve and prepare themselves for the next 
conflict are limited: militaries can either change how they do business or change what 
they do business with. In this thesis, these options will be called organizational 
innovation and technological innovation.   
Technological innovation is easy to understand, but difficult to define.  The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development published the Oslo Manual to 
define innovation for the purposes of collecting data and further study.  Technological 
                                                 
3 Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of Today (London: H. Rees, ltd, 1913) 55. 
4 Bernhardi, 48-63. 
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innovation is defined in two parts: technological product and technological process 
innovation.  This thesis will use the manual’s definition for technological product 
innovation: “A technologically new product is a product whose technical characteristics 
or intended uses differs significantly from those of previously produced products.  Such 
innovations can involve radically new technologies, can be based on combining existing 
technologies in new uses, or can be derived from the use of new knowledge.”5  In 
layman’s terms, it is the latest "gee-whiz" toy that the military-industrial complex has 
developed.  It is the tank, machine gun, Stealth bomber, Tomahawk missile, and GPS 
receivers that fascinate the military.  In this thesis, technological innovation will be 
divided into three categories: weapon technology, transportation technology and 
information technology.  Weapon technologies are the actual weapons deployed, whereas 
transportation technologies are the platforms that weapons are carried on, such as ships, 
tanks and aircraft.  Information technology allows for both information gathering through 
sensors and satellites and communication through radios, Internet and telephony. 
Organizational innovation redefines how the military does business.  Joyce 
Wycoff defines organizational innovation as intended change.  Innovation is a three piece 
definition: “having a common direction or vision, recognizing and deciding on 
opportunities related to the vision and intentionally and effectively moving in a direction 
to achieve the objective”.6  Stephen Peter Rosen, professor of National Security and 
Military Affairs at Harvard, bends this general framework into a military context.  He 
defines a major military innovation as “a change that forces one of the primary combat 
arms of a service to change its concepts of operations and its relation to other combat 
arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional missions.  Such innovations involve a new 
way of war, with new ideas of how the components of the organization relate to each 
other and to the enemy, and new operational procedures conforming to those ideas.  They 
involve changes in critical tasks, the tasks around which warplans revolve.”7  Both of 
these definitions leave open the possibility of introducing new technology as a type of 
                                                 
5 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Oslo Manual (Eurostat: European 
Commision, 1996) 33. 
6 Wycoff, 1. 
7 S.P. Rosen, “New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,” International Security Summer 
1988: 134. 
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innovation.  Organizational innovation as it is defined for the purpose of this thesis will 
consider the introduction of new technology into organizational innovation as a third type 
of innovation separate from purely organizational innovation.   
In this thesis, an organizational innovation will be defined as an innovation where 
one of the primary combat arms of a service adopts new ideas about how the components 
of the organization relate to each other and to the enemy, abandoning or downgrading 
traditional missions.  Organizational innovation involves recognizing and deciding on 
new critical tasks.  Some organizational innovations that will be explored in this thesis 
include the Boer Commandos during the Boer War, the Royal Navy’s decision to adopt 
convoying during WWI and Ludendorff’s storm-troop squads during WWI.  What all of 
these organizational innovations have in common is that new war-fighting capabilities 
were introduced simply by reorganizing the manner in which the forces related to each 
other and how technology was used.  Organizational innovation may not involve any new 
technology at all.  It simply makes the most effective use of what is available.  
Finally, militaries can use a combination of both organizational and technological 
innovation.  This is a risky proposition, allowing national interests to depend on untested 
technology and organizations; however, it also has the potential for the greatest returns.  
Ideally, the technological and organizational innovations will support and enhance each 
other, contributing a much more effective military force.  A force truly dedicated to 
rebuilding and strengthening itself, as the German military was during the interwar 
periods of the 1920’s and 1930’s, may take advantage of this combination of both types 
of innovation. 
This thesis will examine case studies of militaries that have attempted all three of 
these methods of innovation.  Chapter II will examine militaries that innovated 
technologically, Chapter III will examine militaries that innovated organizationally and 
Chapter IV will examine militaries that innovated both technologically and 
organizationally.  Each case study will look at the development of the technology and/or 
organization in a specific military and that military’s effectiveness in the next armed 
conflict or some other test of its success.  In each chapter, failures and success stories will 
be examined and analyzed.  These questions will be asked: Is this a successful method of 
5 
innovation? Why did a method fail if it worked for so many other militaries?  Why did a 
method succeed when it failed so many other nations?  What makes this a successful 
form of innovation?  In this manner, the value of each method will be measured. 
This begs the question of how effectiveness or success will be measured in this 
thesis.  Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth N. Watman define “a fully 
effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources 
physically and politically available”.8  While it is impossible to know whether maximum 
combat power has been derived from a specific innovation, it is easy to gage whether an 
innovation has significantly improved combat power.  In this thesis, a new technological 
innovation will be considered effective if it yields more positive results than could have 
been achieved with older, more traditional technology.  A new organization is effective if 
it yields more results than older organizations had yielded.  The German panzer divisions 
will be considered effective in this thesis because they captured a territory in weeks that 
Germany had failed to capture in four years during WWI.  Military effectiveness in this 
thesis is measured in territories gained or controlled, convoys that survive or sink, targets 
hit or supplies lost.   
Several cases, such as the German armored division during WWII, the German u-
boat command during WWII and Commando military operations during the Boer War 
will be declared successful even though the militaries ultimately lost the conflict they 
were engaged in.  Victory is a combination of many factors: politics, military strategy, 
economic strength and natural resources are only a few of a long list that is not solely 
dependant on military effectiveness.  For example, the Chiapas movement in Mexico has 
won significant concessions from the Mexican government, despite the fact that the 
activists were devastated in their only major military action.  This thesis ignores political 
ramifications of military success and other issues that contribute to international affairs 
and instead focuses on a small part of what contributes to victory: military innovation.   
The goal of this thesis is focus more clearly on how militaries choose to innovate 
or not to innovate their technologies and their organizations.  Innovation is not something 
to be approached haphazardly and without strategy. Chris Hables Gray claims that 
militaries have historically attempted to make war better through a variety of efforts and 
                                                 
8 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth N. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military 
Organizations” International Security Summer 1986: 37. 
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have consistently failed, only making it more costly in terms of economic and human 
capital.9  Part of this is due to an unprincipled approach to innovation; pulling the newest 
weapons and the most popular, jargon riddled organizational concepts off the shelf.  
Innovation needs to be approached with care and consistency.  As this chapter is being 
written, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is testifying to Congress about why he 
wants to end funding for the Crusader Artillery System.  Secretary Rumsfeld maintains 
that his decision to cut funding “is about foregoing a system originally designed for a 
different strategic context to make room more promising technologies that can accelerate 
transformation.”10  His point is that this particular technological innovation does not 
match the organizational innovation that the military is pursuing.  A consistent strategy is 
important. 
This thesis is taking one step further back than SECDEF Rumsfeld and asks the 
following question: how should one pursue innovation?  Yes, it is important to be 
consistent, but are we consistently pursuing the most effective methods of innovation?  
Should one pursue the newest technology?  Should a military try the most modern 
organizational innovations?  Is a combination of both the best answer?  These are the 










                                                 
9 Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War (New York: The Guilford Press, 1997) 3-4. 
10 Donald Rumsfeld SECDEF, Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee 16 May 2002 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/05/16/rumsfeld.crusader.reut/index.html (16 May 2002). 
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II. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Pursuing technological innovation is the most common way militaries try to 
improve their effectiveness.  Having the largest, fastest, most powerful weapon around 
gives a distinct advantage to the owner.  Militaries that focus on this form of innovation 
are convinced that science holds the answers to any obstacles that are created, if only the 
right bits of scientific information can be put together.  Maj Gen J.F.C. Fuller, Royal 
Army is quoted as saying that “Tools or weapons, if only the right ones can be 
discovered, form 99 percent of victory. . . .  Strategy, command, leadership, courage, 
discipline, supply, organization and all the moral and physical paraphernalia of war are as 
nothing to a high superiority of weapons—at most they go to form the one percent which 
makes the whole possible.”11 
The American military in particular is enamored with this approach.  According 
to Chris Hables Gray, Americans adopted their love of technology because of the 
victories they attributed to it during the Second World War.  The science and technology 
that built the atomic bomb, designed the firestorms of Dresden and Tokyo, and built 
aircraft carriers were the true victors of the war in the eyes of policy makers.  This was 
the opinion of the military elite and those who helped determine and shape much of U.S. 
military policy in the post war era.12   
This chapter will examine several cases of militaries that have innovated by 
adding new and improved weaponry into their arsenals.  Specifically, it will examine 
militaries that have attempted to innovate exclusively with new technology and ignored 
organizational innovation to support their new acquisitions.  Technology on the 
battlefield can broadly be divided into three groups: weapons, transportation and 
information systems technology.  Cases of militaries that have invested in all three forms 
of technology will be examined.  The incorporation of the machine gun into the British 
army and the German army’s use of chemical weapons during WWI will be discussed as 
                                                 
11 Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War (New York: The Guilford Press, 1997) 107. 
12 Gray, 70-82. 
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examples of technologically innovative new weapons.  The Confederate Army’s use of 
the railraod during the interwar period will be examined as an example of transportation 
technology.  The British navy’s incorporation of radio during the battle of Jutland and the 
recent U.S. Army experiments with a digitized force (Force XXI) will be examined as 
case studies of militaries using new information technologies.   
These cases have been selected to look at different militaries and types of 
technological innovation over the last century.  They illustrate militaries that have fit new 
technologies into their existing organizations or sometimes have reverted to older and 
more outdated organizations as opposed to revising them to fit the new technologies.  The 
research and development costs of new technology are high, and only a few economically 
powerful nation states have found it beneficial to subsidize such extensive research.  So 
the militaries examined are similar in that they belong to large, powerful nations such as 
Germany, the United States, and England. 
Arthur C. Clarke wrote a short story entitled “Superiority” in which the narrator 
blames his nation’s recent loss in war on their over-confidence in weapons that were not 
yet perfected.  The losing military was betrayed by three different technologies.  The first 
was a sphere of annihilation that would destroy everything in a given radius around it.  
This weapon had to be deployed as a missile to avoid destroying friendly forces.  Inspired 
by successful results in the laboratory, the military immediately converted its entire 
missile launching capability to use this new weapon.  This required some redesign and 
development of current missiles, which could not safely operate with the sphere of 
annihilation.  This refitting of missiles took a year, during which time the enemy had 
feverishly built a large fleet of less advanced ships and won the next few engagements 
because of the sheer size of their forces.   
The next technological innovation introduced into the fictional military was the 
Battle Analyzer, which would scientifically determine the most efficient course of action.  
Unfortunately, the training for operators of this information technology was difficult and 
only two analyzers could be fully staffed.  Because of the size of the equipment, it was 
carried on an unarmed cruise-liner.  The enemy soon discovered that the unarmed 
cruisers were a critical vulnerability and attacked.  The nations’ forces had to retreat as 
9 
they no longer had a capability to organize the engagement.  The Battle Analyzer was the 
penultimate information system. 
The final technological innovation introduced was the Exponential Field, which 
camouflaged ships from the enemy by distorting the space-time continuum.  As the 
exponential field affected the location of the ships with respect to enemy ships, it can be 
viewed as a transportation technology.  Unfortunately the Exponential Field left ships 
without communications or effective navigation equipment and the ships were forced to 
retreat.  The implied warning is that technology is fallible.13  It is also interesting to note 
that the author divided his technologies into three categories: weapons, transportation and 
information. 
B. WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY 
Militaries that are enamored of innovating by adding new technologies into their 
arsenals are often motivated by examples of smaller, technologically advanced militaries 
that have defeated larger forces which were using relatively rudimentary technologies.  
The innovators are captivated by the idea that a few men with advanced weapons can 
defeat an enemy ten times their size.  This idea is clearly demonstrated in the British 
army’s use of the machine gun to colonize Africa. 
The machine gun captured the popular imagination during the European 
colonization of Africa during the late 1800’s.  The Gatling gun, one of the first machine 
guns, was a remarkable improvement over previous weapons.  The first Gatlings made in 
1862 fired 100 rounds per minute, while later models twenty years later could fire 1,000 
rounds a minute.14  The rate of fire of the rifle musket, the primary infantry weapon at the 
time, was three rounds per minute under live fire, and slightly better in an ideal 
situation.15  The British colonial campaigns in Africa are particularly good examples of 
the potency of this new weapon.  Because colonial wars were considered secondary wars 
                                                 
13 Arthur C. Clark, “Superiority” (New York: Fantasy House Inc., 1951) 351-359. 
14 Mollie Gilbert, “Ahead of its Time: The Gatling Gun and the Reconstruction” 31 January 2001 
http://www.columbia.edu/~mrg24/warfare.html (6 March 2002.).  Gilbert also notes a reluctance to use 
machine guns on the part of military commanders because they felt that the weapon challenged their honor, 
patriotism, courage and virtue. 
15 Daniel Commins, “Frontiers: The Machine Gun” 30 November 2001 
http://www.geocities.com/dencee/Before.htm (15 March 2002). 
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by British military leadership, limited numbers of troops were sent to the area.  The small 
scale of the conflict meant that most wars were a series of skirmishes.  This case will 
examine the role of the machine gun in the Battle of Ulundi during the Anglo-Zulu War 
(1879), the battle of Tel-el-Kebir (1882) during the Sudan Wars and a brief skirmish in 
Transvaal (1896) that was one of the catalysts of the Boer War.  
In 1879, British forces were engaged in Zululand.  The machine gun was fully 
adopted by the British navy, but not yet by the army.  The initial British force of 13,200 
men was virtually annihilated by a force of over 40,000 Zulu warriors who used 
swarming tactics and the element of surprise.  After the British army reinforced to the 
size of 4,300 men and two Gatling machine guns, the fortunes of the militaries were 
reversed.   
The Gatling machine guns were manned by a naval battalion and under control of 
a midshipman, simply taking the individuals who used the gun at sea on shore.  The army 
had no experience with the weapon and had not altered its organization to allow training 
or specialization with the machine gun.  Because the machine gun was perceived as 
artillery and the army was unfamiliar with its use, the Gatling was used in a square 
formation, which was considered an outdated and less effective formation by the 1860’s, 
more than a decade before this engagement.  The commanding officer chose this 
formation because he desired to engage in a fair fight, to let the Zulus know that the 
British could defeat them without the “trickery” of modern tactics.16  473 Zulus died 
within a radius of 500 yards of the machine guns in the Battle of Ulundi (1879).  The 
Zulus lost over 1500 warriors while British forces lost only twelve soldiers.17  Because of 
the overwhelming success of this battle, the British employed the square formation for all 
subsequent engagements involving Gatling guns.  This means that British not only failed 
to create new organization when employing the machine gun, but actually reverted to 
older concepts of operations that had earlier been proven less effective than current 
tactics. 
                                                 
16John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) 84. 
17The Kwazulu-Natal Department of Econmic Development and Tourism, “The Battle of Ulundi” 17 
September 2002  http://www.kzn-deat.gov.za/tourism/battlefields/conflict/ulundi.htm (14 May 2002). 
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The next skirmish to be examined occurred on the other side of the African 
continent.  A nationalistic military party led by Muhammad Ahmad with strong religious 
and anti-foreign sentiments challenged the puppet government installed in Egypt by the 
French and British in the early 1880’s.  On September 12, 1882, British troops attacked 
the Egyptian rebel stronghold at Tel-el-Kebir, which was defended by 38,000 men and 60 
pieces of artillery. The British attacking force at Tel-el-Kebir numbered only 15,000, 
outnumbered almost three to one.   However, the majority of casualties and deaths were 
Egyptian.  Over 2,000 Egyptians were killed and 500 wounded before the Egyptians 
retreated seven hours after the battle began.   The naval machine gun battery, consisting 
of six Gatling machine guns manned by 30 seamen, was considered the key instrument in 
the British victory.  London newspapers glorified the machine gun and the lopsided 
victory that it created.18     
Rumors, myths and folklore began to spread about the power of the machine gun 
in the more primitive tribes.  Because the Maxim machine guns that were used had a 
small seat for the gunner at the trail piece, there were rumors of men who could assume 
the common position for relief of nature and eject streams of bullets.19  Other myths 
included beliefs that bullets fired over rivers would turn into water or that certain magical 
potions or talismans would protect warriors from the machine gun’s bullets.  The tribes 
certainly did not lack for valor.  Warriors were known to launch themselves in wave after 
wave at machine gun fire.   
These same machine guns that were the subject of African tribal myths also 
betrayed their operators at inopportune times.  Early machine guns jammed, because the 
bullets were not correctly shaped for the barrel.20  Sometimes only a few rounds could be 
fired before a malfunction of some sort took place.  It was decided that a very skilled 
troop or officer must be present with each weapon, as they were temperamental and often 
broke down.  Nonetheless, the great successes of the weapon inspired false confidence in 
many.  Dr. Leander Starr Jameson was so impressed with the performance of the Maxim 
                                                 
18 Donald Toppel and Paul Wahl, The Gatling Gun (New York: Arco Publishing Company, Inc., 1965) 
108. 
19 Ellis, 91. 
20 Ellis, 63.   
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machine guns during the Matabele war that he decided to bring eight guns with him to 
combat the Boer commandos in Transvaal (1896).  He bragged that with his Maxim guns 
he would “draw a zone of lead a mile each side of my column and no Boer will be able to 
live in it”.21  Unfortunately, he did not bring enough water on his expedition to cool the 
guns, and they jammed almost immediately during the first engagement.  He was 
surrounded by Boer commandos and forced to surrender.   
Dr. Jameson would have done well to heed the warnings of Arthur C. Clarke’s 
cautionary tale.  The Maxim gun was like fictional army’s sphere of annihilation.  
Dependence on the weapon left both Clarke’s fictional army and Dr. Jameson vulnerable 
when deprived of its use.  However, it is the success stories like the Battle of Ulundi that 
inspire militaries to seek technological innovation. 
It can be said that colonial wars in Africa were not exactly a tough test of military 
effectiveness.  While the British forces may have been outnumbered, the playing field 
was certainly not equal.  Futurist Alvin Toffler would claim that most of the tribes the 
British fought against were first wave societies: focused on agriculture, hunting and 
producing what one consumed.  Britain, a second wave nation, was a leader of the 
industrial revolution, where weapons and war were mass-produced.  The tribal resistance 
was futile, simply another example of second wave societies overwhelming and 
eventually replacing first wave societies.  In cases of mass disparities between 
adversaries, technological innovation will produce remarkable triumphs. However, when 
the machine gun was used between equally advanced nations in WWI, and its main 
contribution to military effectiveness was an increase in the number of casualties on the 
battlefield.  It was not until the German Army developed storm troop organization and 
tactics at the end of WWI that the machine gun was effectively used.22 
A better test of the effectiveness of innovational weapons is the use of chemical 
agents during WWI.  Chemical agents were developed and researched at the turn of the 
century.  Concerned about the ramifications of chemical warfare and how it would 
redefine the nature of war, weapons whose sole purpose was the dispersion of 
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asphyxiating or deleterious gas were banned in the Hague convention of 1899.  This 
decision was reinforced by the Hague II treaty, which expanded upon the original to also 
ban the use of poison or poisoned weapons.  All future combatants in WWI except the 
United States, Turkey and Italy were signatories of Hague II.23 
However, neither Hague I or II had provisions for enforcement of the treaty.  
France began to develop a liquid explosive, turpinite, that gave off lethal fumes and 
caused death by asphyxiation.  After discovering French research into chemical agents, 
the German High Command felt justified in being the first power to use purely chemical 
weapons.  Germany is credited with first use of chemical weapons at Ypres, using 
180,000 kg of chlorine gas from 5,730 cylinders on the line between Steenstraat on the 
Yser Canal, at 5 pm on 22 April 1915.24  The gas cloud blew with the wind, and either 
killing or causing the French and Algerian troops in the opposing trenches to flee, 
opening a 8 to 9 km gap in the Allied line.  It is interesting to note that the first chemical 
attacks occurred at Ypres not because the site was suited for such an attack, but because 
other German commanders refused to use gas in their theaters.25 
Chemical agents are classified by their effects on victims.  Lachrymators are 
designed to affect the eyes, but may also cause respiratory problems when exposed to a 
large amount of the chemical, while asphyxiators cause fluid to enter the lungs and 
slowly deprive the victim of oxygen. Sternutators cause respiratory irritation, sneezing, 
nausea, and vomiting. Blister agents such as mustard gas initially cause pain in the eyes, 
throats, and lungs, but later cause blisters on exposed skin.26  Chemical attacks during the 
later war years combined several different gases to maximize the damaging effect of the 
chemicals.  Over eighteen different chemical compounds were used as chemical agents, 
the most common being chlorine, phosgene, diphosgene, chloropicrin, hydrogen cyanide, 
cyanogen chloride, and mustard gases.27 
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The main methods to deliver chemical agents were by cylinders and artillery. 
Cylinders were the most common early in the war because they were refillable and 
Germany lacked sufficient gas-shell production ability. Once Germany created artillery 
shells that could be filled with chemical agents and maintain a relatively stable flight 
path, they abandoned unpredictable cylinder-based attacks. 
Cylinders released gas clouds that would drift towards the enemy. The placement 
of cylinders was a time consuming project that took several days of labor. Troops 
transported the 100-pound cylinders from drop-off points through trenches to the front 
lines. Soldiers then planted the cylinders in the ground to protect them from enemy 
artillery fire. The movement and placement of these cylinders was done under the cover 
of darkness so that the enemy could not detect it. If the enemy detected these 
preparations, artillery would target these areas with harassing fire. This tactic impeded 
the placement of the cylinders and sometimes damaged the cylinders themselves, 
exposing German troops to their own chemical agents. 
The speed and direction of the wind was critical to a successful gas cylinder 
attack. The wind needed to be blowing towards the enemy at a speed sufficient to move it 
away from the release point, yet slow enough for it to linger over enemy positions. A 
shift in winds could expose friendly troops to chemicals instead of the intended target.  In 
a series of three gas attacks against Russian troops in vicinity of Bzura and Rawka from 
31 May 1915 to 6 July 1915, over 3000 German soldiers became casualties when winds 
shifted and blew the poisonous chemicals towards the German troops.28  The lack of 
favorable winds often delayed chemical operations for days or even weeks. This 
dependence on uncontrollable factors encouraged the development of artillery-based 
attacks.   
Artillery-based attacks were superior to cylinder based attacks because artillery 
could be directed at a specific area, a distance from the front lines.  Also, artillery shells 
had been designed to either disperse a quantity of gas over a great distance that would 
quickly clear up and allow occupation of the area or concentrate gas in a specific area and 
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make it uninhabitable for days.29  By the end of the war, one fourth of all artillery shells 
were gas.  Neither of these strategies were organizationally or strategically innovative. 
Using cylinders limited the German army’s mobility and made them a slave to the winds, 
and artillery based attacks simply fit into traditional artillery tactics.  Even the method of 
producing the chemicals themselves was not innovative. 
German scientists were in the forefront of chemical weapons innovation.  
Professor Fritz Haber, a Nobel Laureate, was chief of the German chemical warfare 
service during WWI and is considered the father of modern chemical warfare.30  
However, the chemical warfare service was not an organizational innovation.  Over two 
thousand chemists were employed by the government to create chemical weapons.  They 
worked in isolation, unable to consult with colleagues or collaborate in their efforts, to 
create large quantities of chemicals.  Communications between the chemical warfare 
service and troops on the front were minimal.  Most tactics and operations were created 
as the troops employed the weapons, not from previous planning or training.  
Nonetheless, it is estimated that German chemical development was about six months 
ahead of Allied chemical development.31  Conversely, Allied innovation in gas masks 
was superior to German gas mask technology.  This is partially due to the limited amount 
of materials the German military had available for the creation of gas masks.32  Strangely 
enough, the chemical warfare service was not responsible for anti-chemical warfare 
research of any sort. 
What is most striking about chemical warfare during WWI was that it wasn’t 
credited with giving either military a decisive advantage over the other.  On 22 and 23 
July 1916, over 110,000 chemical shells filled with phosgene were fired at the French 
defense at the Battle of Verdun.  Due to a lack of troops, the German military was unable 
to seize the temporary advantage created.  Other attacks were deflected by the use of 
advanced gas masks.  A total of 150,000 tons of chemicals were produced for chemical 
warfare purposes, and 125,000 tons of that was actually used on the battlefield.  The most 
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significant result yielded was an increase in the number of deaths.  A. M. Prentiss, author 
of Chemicals in War: A Treatise on Chemical Warfare, estimated that 1,296,853 
casualties were produced by chemical warfare.33  Other estimates are lower, since they 
may not take into account soldiers who later succumbed to injuries caused by chemical 
weapons.34  Given that there were an estimated ten million casualties during the war, 
chemical warfare seems to claim a high percentage of victims with little tactical, warfare.  
Instead of achieving a Jominian decisive victory, chemical warfare seems to have 
encouraged a costly war of attrition on both sides.  The only innovation the weapon 
offered was to increase the number of battle casualties.  Technologically innovative 
weapons alone seem only to work in limited circumstances, in what would be considered 
weak tests of innovative weapons.  Machine guns will slaughter natives with spears, but 
two European powers will simply deplete their populations using chemical warfare 
against each other. 
C. TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY 
There is more than one way to bring new technology into the battlefield.  One 
method is to have the innovative technology bring you to the battlefield, i.e. new forms of 
transportation.  This will be the technology for the next case study.  It will explore the 
Confederate army’s use of the railroad during the Civil War.  It is another example of a 
military that innovated technologically, but did not innovate organizationally.   
Friedrich Wilhelm Harkort, a Prussian, was the first to recognize the military 
potential of the newly established railroads, and presented his ideas of rapidly moving an 
army across interior lines of communication in the book, The Railway from Minden to 
Cologne in 1833.35  However, it was in the American Civil War, almost thirty years later 
that the full scope of rail movement was finally exploited.  According to historian Ernest 
Carter, military operations involving the railroad during the Civil War showed “the great 
necessity for adequate organizations to cope with the repair of lines damaged by enemy 
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action and the systematic disorganization of …railway communication”.36  This lesson 
was learned from the failure of the Confederacy to fully utilize their railroads. 
Railway growth in the United States from the 1820’s to 1860’s was exponential.  
At the beginning of the Civil War, the Confederacy controlled 9,000 miles of track.  On 
18 April 1861, the Confederate army was the first military involved in the conflict to use 
trains to move troops, only six days into the war.  Three trains of Confederate troops were 
transported to Harper’s Ferry.  Because of the agricultural nature of the southern states, 
most railroads were short lines that led from valleys where crops were grown to major 
ports where goods could be shipped abroad.  For example, the Virginia Central line 
operated slightly more than 200 miles of track with 27 engines and 241 cars in the Upper 
Shenandoah.  The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac operated 75 miles of track with 
11 engines and 134 cars.  The Manassas Gap operated 100 miles of track with 9 engines 
and 233 cars.37  Many of these lines had poor, if any, connectivity to each other.  This is 
because the rails were not of a standardized width, which ranged from 6 feet to 4’10” in 
varying lines.  The tracks themselves were of the older U variety, and not the more 
durable T variety and were prone to wear quickly under heavy military loads.  However, 
in a few aspects, the railroads in the Confederacy were superior to Northern rails.  Unlike 
Washington D.C., which relied on a single rail track, Richmond had five different tracks 
leading into and out of the city, allowing for better communication.  Also, the 
Confederacy had the advantage of interior lines of communication. 
Railways became central to U.S. military operations, both Union and Confederate.  
With the introduction of the telegraph, it was possible to communicate quickly with 
troops hundreds of miles away.  Railways were used to move troops, bring supplies to the 
battlefield and evacuate the dead and wounded.  Before the rail, it was necessary for 
troops to march long distances on foot, often arriving to battles tired and hungry.  With 
the railroad, it was possible for troops to move hundreds of miles in a few days.  In 
previous conflicts, a military’s ability to continue fighting depended on its ability to 
receive supplies, which placed a great deal of pressure on the quartermasters, who were 
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in charge of supplying the troops with food, clothing, ammunition and medical supplies. 
Therefore, the quartermasters sometimes used the railroads to excess, shipping more 
supplies than were necessary to the front lines.38  However, the railroads allowed enough 
supplies to be transported to the battlefields that meager supply lines was rarely a critical 
issue.    
While military leadership in the Union recognized the importance of the railroads 
to the war effort and coordinated closely with rail owners and managers, Confederate 
leadership ignored their deteriorating railways.  In 1861, the Confederate Congress 
refused to pass a law authorizing President Jefferson Davis to assume control of the 
railroads when military expediency required it.39  Transportation issues involving the 
railroads fell to the Quartermaster of the Confederate Army, General Abraham C. Myers.  
His authority was limited to arranging contracts for transportation of troops and supplies.  
He was also limited by the existing status of the railroads, as he was not authorized to 
extend or improve them.40  Throughout the course of the war, railway operation, 
management and repair remained a strictly civilian pursuit. 
Railroads themselves began to appeal to the Confederate Congress for aid as they 
were devastated by the war.  Military loads were heavier than the loads that the rail 
systems usually transported, and the weight strained the weak tracks.  Also the punishing 
schedule on the rails to meet the needs of the army meant that rails and cars did not 
receive necessary maintenance and were pushed until they broke.  Attacks on track, 
engines, cars and bridges were common throughout the war, and since the Confederate 
government did not authorize the Quartermaster to provide soldiers to guard the rails or 
repair them after damage, the railroads were bearing the brunt of the cost.41  Once a few 
railroad improvement projects received appropriated money from the Confederate 
government, an onslaught of claims from railroad owners were placed before the 
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Congress.  Though many of the claims were frivolous or greedy, they all urged the 
completion of their particular road as “military necessity”.42   
Even with appropriated money, the Confederacy had little ability to repair and 
replace tracks and engines lost or damaged as they were lacking in both raw materials 
and establishments that manufactured engines.  The government had appropriated all iron 
produced in the south and had decided that it was too valuable to expend on railroad 
repair.  In a letter to Secretary Lawton, Captain F.W. Sims complained that: “The 
government controls everything the railroads need but will not share it with them.  So 
long as that policy continues, railroad service will continue to decline.”43  The supplies 
he was referring to included rubber for engine tires, iron and steel for stronger tracks and 
manpower to repair damaged vehicles and tracks.  The Confederate government had 
adopted a policy of “borrowing” tracks and trains from other lines, which was temporary 
relief at best. 
Because the Confederate government failed to coordinate railway transportation 
for their troops, sometimes the troops took it upon themselves to do so.  Especially early 
in the war, troops were known to commandeer trains to transport themselves to various 
theaters.  The Confederate government’s inability to centralize train operations led to 
military commanders only using rails when it expressly suited their purposes, and failed 
to encourage them to think of rail transportation as a system that operated as a whole.44  
Another factor that discouraged Confederate troops from using trains was that tracks 
were not yet standardized in the South, as they were in the North.  This meant that most 
journeys required troops to load and unload themselves and their supplies several times 
because trains from one railroad could not operate on another railroad.  
On 3 December 1862, the Secretary of War nominated William M. Wadley, 
president of the Vicksburg & Shreveport, to supervise and control transportation with 
respect to railroads in the Confederate States.45  He was given a little more authority than 
General Myers, but he was still incapable of protecting railroads, or forcing them to 
cooperate.  His suggestions for the improvement of the rail system were remarkably 
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similar to the system that had already been instituted by the Union army.  However, when 
the Confederate senate refused to approve Wadley’s nomination on 01 May 1863, the 
government abandoned the idea of centrally controlling the railroads for the war efforts.  
F.W. Sims, who had no more authority than Wadley to affect any change or force 
cooperation from the railroads, eventually replaced Wadley.  The Confederate 
government did not attempt any other organizational innovation to improve their military 
usage of the railroads. 
The train system deteriorated over the course of the war years, becoming less and 
less usable as the war progressed.  While the Confederate loss of the Civil War is 
attributable to many factors, the disparity in their abilities to effectively use the same 
technology highlights the ineffectiveness of transportation technology alone.  Without an 
organization to maintain and defend modes of transportation, the transportation capability 
deteriorated until it was virtually nonexistent. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
The final type of technological innovation to be discussed is information technology.  
Information technology encompasses both communications technology and information 
gathering technologies, such as sensors and radars.  Cryptography, code breaking, 
steganography and similar technologies that protect information and communications 
also fall into this category.   
The following two cases examine militaries that improved their information 
technologies without commensurately improving their organization.  Unlike the crushing 
defeat of the Battle Analyzer in war, neither of these cases provided great victories or 
devastating losses for the militaries in question.  They do, however, demonstrate the 
futility of adopting new sensing and communications technologies when current tactics 
and organization only demand earlier, less advanced sensing and communications 
capabilities.  If one can but does not need to communicate more, the information 
technology tends to be ignored at best and a hindrance at worst.  The cases that will be 
examined are the Battle of Jutland and the United States Army’s Force XXI experiments 
in the late 1990’s. 
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Technology played a large role in the Battle of Jutland.  When the British 
commissioned the H.M.S. Dreadnought in 1905, modern battle ships were redefined 
overnight.  H.M.S. Barram, a later member of the dreadnought class, became the British 
flagship at the Battle of Jutland.  The H.M.S. Barram was the first oil-fired ship with a 
maximum speed of 25 knots, carrying 15-inch guns, which fired projectiles that weighed 
1,920 pounds.46  The H.M.S. Barram also had a radio, which could communicate with 
other ships or naval establishments at distances of over 60 miles, whereas semaphores 
and flashing lights, the previous communications technologies, were limited by visibility.  
Only on a clear day, could ships over ten miles apart successfully communicate with each 
other.  It is this technology that this case study is going to explore.  Despite a great deal 
of technological innovation and a lengthy pause between major naval engagements, the 
British had not innovated organizationally since the time of Trafalgar, with regards to 
operational battle fleets.  While the results were not as disastrous as the retrograde French 
tank organization proved to be, the Battle of Jutland did not provide decisive victory for 
the British. 
One of the more notable technological advances of World War I weaponry was 
the introduction of the radio into the battlefield.  Ships were ideal platforms for radios 
because they had a constant source of power from their engines and a terrain that was free 
from obstacles.  In 1899, Signor Guglielmo Marconi, inventor of the radio, equipped the 
first British naval vessel with radio.47  By 1916, most ships in the British fleet were 
equipped with radio; the task of equipping the entire fleet with radios was completed by 
1917.  
However, signaling was still promoted as the preferred method of communication, 
and recently (1908), it had been made an officer specialty, on par with navigation or 
gunnery.  No knowledge of radio was necessary to receive the S (signaling) specialty 
code.  The W/T (wireless telegraphy) was under the control of the torpedomen 
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(electricians), despite recommendations that the two areas be joined.48  Because of this, 
officers were never fully trained in use of the radio and were encouraged to pursue older 
technology and forms of communication as a new specialty.  The Admiralty focused on 
signaling as a form of communication, and the Signal school was considered the site of 
lively debate concerning modern naval developments. 
The British fleet had not engaged in a major offensive action since the days of 
Horatio Nelson, over 100 years earlier.  Organization in the British fleet had advanced 
little since Nelson’s time, either.  “In the Royal Navy during the First World War the 
continued rigid adherence to eighteenth century line-of-battle strategy is an example of 
the degree to which the traditional way of doing things dominated naval thinking.”49 
According to Sir John Keegan, the British admiralty had fostered an environment where 
it was next to impossible to learn how to conduct a battle or to innovate in any manner: 
organizationally, operationally or tactically.50   
Since organizational innovation was not encouraged, the need for new 
information technology was not recognized.  Senior leadership was not educated in how 
to use technology, and therefore technology that wasn’t transparent (faster ships, better 
bombs, more armor) wasn’t used.  The misuse of the radio was apparent in British 
actions.  Admirals preferred to use flag hoists to communicate.  This was due in part to 
the desire to emulate the days of Nelson and also in part to the “fetish of secrecy and an 
undue obsession with the dangers of detection”.51   
At 15:45 on May 1916, the Battle of Jutland began when Vice Admiral Sir David 
Beatty, Commander of the First Battlecruiser squadron, of the Royal Navy spotted 
Admiral Franz von Hipper’s fleet of forty ships sweeping the Danish coast.  After 
spotting the German fleet, Admiral Beatty raised his flag hoist, signaling to the other 
ships to follow his lead, but did not duplicate his message via radio.  Only five other 
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battle cruisers followed his lead towards the German Fleet, and Beatty’s squadron was 
consequently outmatched and destroyed by the opposing fleet.  Alerted to the German 
presence, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, First Lord of the Admiralty, directed his fleet 
towards the Germans.  However, he received little information on the whereabouts of the 
fleet and wasted time searching for the melee.  Historian Andrew Gordon feels that 
Commodore William Goodenough, Commander of the 2nd Light cruiser Squadron, failed 
in not sending timely W/T transmissions.  Light cruisers were tasked with reconnaissance 
and the relying of information to the main battle fleet, as they were not strong enough to 
engage a battleship.  Though he sent three position reports via W/T between 1615 and 
1700, his lack of transmissions after damage to his radio sets prompted Admiral Jellicoe 
to break radio silence twice to inquire about Goodenough’s location.  Instead of sending 
W/T transmissions via one of his subordinate ships with a functioning radio, Goodenough 
chose to communicate via semaphore.52  Meanwhile, Admiral Reinhard von Scheer’s 
High Seas Fleet joined the fray and continued to pummel Beatty’s squadron until 
Admiral Jellicoe finally brought the Grand Fleet to Beatty’s defense.  When the German 
navy noticed the Grand Fleet closing in, Scheer ordered a withdrawal towards the north.  
Admiral Jellicoe gave chase and intercepted the Germans twice for brief engagements 
before the German High Seas Fleet successfully escaped.53   
Radio communications hindered the British efforts several other times during the 
course of the battle.  Ship captains spent five to ten minutes sending radio messages with 
casualty reports while their ships were still under enemy fire.  Other times, messages 
were coded, wasting precious time in coding and decoding, when immediate action was 
required.  H.M.S. Lion apparently lost the radio challenge and reply for the evening of the 
attack and asked for it in the clear, by flashing lamp, which was a great compromise of 
security.54  While the shore-based commands relied upon radio transmissions, the British 
navy ignored the radio’s capabilities once they left port.   
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After the Battle of Jutland, both the British and Germans claimed victory.  The 
Germans lost 11 ships and 2195 sailors, and the British lost 14 and 5914, respectively.55    
Historians generally award the win to the British navy because they retained the capacity 
to mount another major naval campaign, whereas Germany’s Risk Fleet went out of its 
way to eliminate the chance of facing British fire.  Unlike Clarke’s fictional military, the 
British Navy did not collapse when their new information system failed.  Their old 
information system provided sufficient ability to communicate.  However, it can be 
argued that if the British had made better use of the radio, Admiral Beatty’s four fast 
battleships would have been present at the first engagement with the Germans and could 
have prevented the slaughter of the British battlecruisers.  Had the British made better use 
of the radio, they might have inflicted more damage on the fleeing Risk Fleet by 
signaling their positions and giving ADM Jellicoe the information he needed to locate the 
German fleet.  They might also have been able to save the lives of fellow sailors in 
floundering ships.56 
Another example of a military hindered by its new communications technology is 
the United States Army’s recent Force XXI experiments.  Force XXI is the United States 
Army’s vision of future forces, which have been equipped with the latest sensing and 
communications technology.  The principal goal of Force XXI is to improve sensing 
technology in the hopes that better situational awareness will improve unit effectiveness.  
Force XXI also seeks to allow the reduction of intermediate staging requirements and 
reduce the time required to bring troops into combat, allow nonlinear operations and 
reduce the footprint of American forces by dispersing them throughout the battlefield.  
Other goals include paring down logistics and deploying fewer support personnel by 
“beaming” them into the battlefield.57   
The central technology in this effort is the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade 
and Below (FCBB2) command and control system.  Large computer screens, known as 
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appliqué, are found at all the command posts and various platforms.  On the appliqué, one 
can see the status and location of both friendly and enemy forces, improving situational 
awareness.58  This information is fed into the main system by sensors that are attached to 
various battlefield platforms, including tanks, artillery and the M-16s of the infantry.  
What have not been updated in the Force XXI army are the organization of the units in 
battle and the concepts of operations.  Units participating in the battle experiments are 
organized and trained in traditional battlefield tactics.  RAND analysts claim that Force 
XXI is mired in the air-land battle doctrine of the Cold War.59 
In March of 1997, war-fighting experiments involving Force XXI began at the 
National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California.  While the local media and Army 
publicists emphasized the high-tech wizardry of the new weapons systems, not everyone 
was pleased with the results.  The Office of Operational Test and Evaluation in particular 
was alarmed by the results of the war-fighting experiments.  Their primary concern was 
that participants had difficulty distinguishing “good guys” from “bad guys” on the 
battlefield, resulting in as many friendly-fire accidents as the last three non-digitized 
training experiments combined.60  Other concerns included inadequate unit training, 
immature technologies, and the need for on-the-spot work-arounds for malfunctioning 
systems. 
In his “lessons learned” paper, COL Rick Lynch, the commanding officer of the 
1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT), 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas pointed out 
several other weaknesses of Force XXI.  The 1BCT was designated to be the first digital 
brigade and performed the majority of the Force XXI experiments at NTC (National 
Training Center).  His most telling comment is that “technology isn’t the panacea for 
poor training”.61  Because of the time spent training soldiers to use new systems, the time 
spent training them in classic battlefield maneuver was reduced, hurting their 
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performance.  Even though Force XXI was able to see the enemy before the engagement, 
once the units were within firing range, the differences between the Force XXI Brigade 
and the NTC force in battle-space awareness were negligible and the poor training of the 
1BCT showed.62   
In order to combat the system failures, 1BCT brought both the Force XXI 
technology and the older legacy systems into the battlefield, to ensure that at least one 
command and control system was operational.  This mandated increasing the size of the 
force brought to the field, as both systems needed to be maintained, and negated the goal 
of bringing a smaller, nimbler force into the field.63  Also, the weight of new technology 
in terms of the sheer amount of weight a soldier carried with him into the battlefield often 
outweighed the benefit it brought in terms of situational awareness.64 
One thing that was notably missing from the Force XXI plan was new 
organization, tactics and strategy.  Though some acknowledged that the improved sensing 
capabilities could allow for more independent action, no such action was taken during the 
battle experiments.  The results were that Force XXI was not the much more successful 
than conventional units fighting the same enemy at the National Training Center.65   
In examining these two cases, one can conclude that the organization, tactics and 
strategies employed in the past two cases nullified the potential use of new sensing and 
communication technologies.  A military advances as far as its organization will allow.  
The decision-making capabilities of the Royal Navy at the Battle of Jutland were the 
same as during the days of semaphore and flashing lights.  The admirals of the day were 
not accustomed to the new wireless technology and chose not to employ it at critical 
moments.  The outcome of the Battle of Jutland could have been more favorable to the 
British navy had they employed their radios well, but as the radios were employed, the 
outcome would have been remarkably similar if British had not had the technology at all.  
Force XXI suffered from immature technology that hindered what benefits they might 
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have received from a smaller, nimbler force by supporting two command and control 
structures.  They also did not take advantage of their ability for independent action, and 
were forced into the classic battlefield tactics that they were poorly prepared to use.  The 
captains at the Battle of Jutland did not need the radio and the battlefield commanders at 
the National Training Center did not need Force XXI technology.  They were perfectly 
capable of making decisions with their old technology. 
If new technology, especially information technology, is not incorporated into 
strategy, doctrine and organization, then it is more of a hindrance than a help.  This is 
especially true in these last two cases because it is more natural to consider new 
organization with new forms of firepower or modes of transportation.  Even the French 
Army considered and then rejected new armored divisions, while new organization for 
Force XXI was never given serious thought. 
F. CONCLUSION 
What are the themes that these cases illustrate?  They suggest several things, the 
most important of which is that technological innovation alone is often not as successful 
as its owner would like it to be.  Throwing technology at the battlefield is not a panacea 
for an ineffective organization or the difficulties of war.  Sometimes one will achieve 
stunning victories, like the machine gun did in the colonial wars in Africa.  However, for 
every Battle of Tel-el-Kebir, there is a corresponding Battle of France that failed.  Even 
in cases where overwhelming technological superiority cowed the enemy, technology is 
not always the godsend it appears to be.  The Vietnam War is an example where a 
technologically advanced military was beaten back by forces using begged, borrowed and 
stolen technology, which did not compare to the technology that that was available to the 
United States.  This superiority can lead to dependence on a complicated and frail piece 
of equipment that has not yet proven its effectiveness in battle.  What happens if the 
equipment is taken away or no longer functional?  Recent trends also suggest that it will 
become more and more difficult to achieve the technological superiority that 
overwhelmed the African tribesmen, and that arms racing will prove even more costly.  
The U.S.S.R. spent itself into bankruptcy trying to compete with American technology.  
No military, no matter how advanced, is immune from this threat. 
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The advantage now lies with the military that learns how to best manipulate 
technologies to their advantage and organizes themselves to do so.  This is shown in the 
case of railroad use during the Civil War.  The Confederate government refused to take 
responsibility for the rail system, allowing civilian enterprise to bear the brunt of the 
burden of maintaining and repairing roads during wartime.  The condition of Confederate 
railways consequently declined, whereas the Union railways remained functional 
throughout the course of the war.  While technology is available to anyone who can open 
his pocketbook wide enough, organizational innovation is not.  The ability to reorganize 
and rethink traditional methods of waging offensive and defensive campaigns is going to 
be the valuable commodity in today’s information-driven, technologically rich battlefield.  
Conflict in the future will prove the axiom that technology is only as good as the man 
who uses it. 
On the flip side, militaries also have a tendency to ignore the capabilities of new 
technologies that are available to them, because of their unfamiliarity with them, 
specifically communications technology.  A brief chat with the Admiral’s secretary at the 
Naval Postgraduate School reveals that the Admiral spends a portion of each day 
swearing at his computer, trying to reformat documents.  This is similar to the case of the 
Battle of Jutland, where captains of ships either ignored radio communications or spent 
an inordinate amount of time trying to send messages when their attention would have 
been better directed towards the rapidly changing tactical situation.  However, new 
abilities to sense and communicate may allow for the greatest possible organizational 
innovation. 
Overall, bringing new technology into a military’s arsenal seems to have 
disappointing results.  Arthur C. Clarke’s story of a military defeated by its inability to 
handle its own advanced technology should serve as a warning to militaries.   Technology 








III. ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Militaries can choose to modernize themselves purely by means of organizational 
innovation.  Stephen Peter Rosen, professor of National Security and Military Affairs at 
Harvard, defines a major military innovation as “a change that forces one of the primary 
combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operations and its relation to other 
combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional missions.  Such innovations 
involve a new way of war, with new ideas of how the components of the organization 
relate to each other and to the enemy, and new operational procedures conforming to 
those ideas.  They involve changes in critical tasks, the tasks around which warplans 
revolve.”66  This definition leaves open the possibility of introducing new technology as 
a type of innovation.  Organizational innovation as it is defined for the purpose of this 
thesis will consider the introduction of new technology into organizational innovation as 
a third type of innovation separate from purely organizational innovation.   
Therefore, in this thesis, organizational innovation is defined as an innovation 
where one of the primary combat arms of a service adopts new ideas of how the 
components of the organization relate to each other and to the enemy, abandoning or 
downgrading traditional missions.  Organizational innovation involves recognizing and 
deciding on new critical tasks.  Some organizational innovations that will be explored in 
this thesis include Admiral Nelson’s victory at the Battle of Trafalgar, the Boer 
Commandos in Transvaal and the Free Orange State during the Boer War, the Royal 
Navy’s decision to adopt convoying during WWI and Ludendorff’s storm-troop squads 
during WWI.  What all of these organizational innovations have in common is that new 
war-fighting capabilities were introduced simply by reorganizing the manner in which the 
forces fought and technology was used.  Organizational innovation may not involve any 
new technology.  It simply makes the most effective use of what is available. 
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Organizational innovation is sometimes considered the “war of the weak” because 
it is employed by militaries that have no other options in modernizing their forces.  Jarat 
Chopra, professor at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies, 
defines “war of the weak” as revolutionary warfare during the 20th century, where war 
become politics, as opposed to remaining an extension of politics.  This reorganization 
tied the military much more closely to governing authorities and was advocated by Lenin, 
Mao Ze-Dong and Ernesto "Che" Guevara.67  Even the advocates of this type of warfare 
tried to distance themselves from the stigma of being considered weak.  Mao Ze-Dong, 
whose writings heavily influenced the Viet Cong in their tactics and strategy during the 
Vietnam war, wrote that his army should “oppose guerrilla-ism in the Red Army, while 
recognizing the guerrilla character of it operations”.68  Even Mao hoped that the Chinese 
Red Army would eventually be able to face its opposition in a more conventional battle.  
He hoped that a conventional battle would bring a decisive victory and cut short 
protracted war.  Alvin and Heidi Toffler have noted that organizational innovation has 
become a much less popular option for military innovation since the industrial 
revolution.69  As such, militaries that innovated in this manner are considered to have 
been “forced” into a new organization by their limited financial resources or limited 
personnel. 
This chapter will explore several different militaries that have innovated 
organizationally and not technologically.  It will explore militaries that were forced into 
innovating organizationally in order to survive.  The Boer War will be explored as an 
example of a military forced to innovate or cease existing.  Cases of militaries that chose 
to innovate organizationally, even though they had the means to innovate technologically 
will be explored as well. The use of convoying by the British Navy during WWI and 
Admiral Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar will be explored to illustrate this phenomenon.  
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Finally, this chapter will look at an example of a military that innovated organizationally 
but was unsuccessful (met with defeat) in their attempts.  That case is the German defeat 
in the spring of 1918 after the failure of General Ludendorff’s offensives.  In deference to 
the Toffler’s theory, these cases will be discussed in chronological order. 
B. THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR 
The first case chronologically is the Battle of Trafalgar where Admiral Horatio 
Nelson dealt a devastating blow to Franco-Spanish naval power.  The innovative 
organization of the British fleet used at the Battle of Trafalgar influenced navies of the 
world for many years to come.   
Napoleon, Emperor of France, had always been an admirer of Alexander the 
Great, and like him aspired to conquer the whole of Europe.  Great Britain remained the 
most persistent obstacle to his aspirations.  He decided that the best way to overpower the 
British was to lure their navy to the opposite corner of the globe before attacking the 
remnants of the British fleet and invading the British mainland.  By sending his fleet to 
secure French interests in the Caribbean and conquer Dutch vessels stationed there, 
Napoleon hoped to tempt the Royal Navy into following the French navy across the 
Atlantic and protect their own territories in the Caribbean.  Thus, the prelude to the Battle 
of Trafalgar included a chase across the Atlantic and back, as Nelson pursued Admiral 
Pierre-Charles Villeneuve, Commander at Toulon, and his fleet.  When the French fleet 
returned to its homeport, a blockade was organized to report on its movements. 
The naval technology of 1804 had not changed significantly in centuries.  Since 
the commissioning of H.M.S. Sovereign of the Seas in 1637, the first rate ships of the line 
had been 100-gun three-deckers, and the size, speed and shape of naval war ships 
remained relatively constant until the time of Trafalgar.70  Though improvements in 
metallurgy and gunnery allowed for larger and more powerful cannons, this was an 
incremental and not dramatic improvement in war vessels.  A reliable chronometer was 
invented in the 1760’s and was used for navigational purposes until the invention of 
radar.  The telescope was invented in the 1600’s and was a staple aboard ships.  The most 
recent bit of technology aboard ships was a new vocabulary signal book created by 
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Admiral Home Popham.  It allowed commanders to spell out their orders simply and 
communicate more effectively by creating a pseudo-alphabet with differently colored 
flags.  It also had an index of 3000 common orders that could be issued with a single flag 
hoist.71   
Operational naval fleet organization also had not changed in the last hundred 
years.  Fleets about to engage in battle attempted to sail in formation, a single long line of 
ships.  They then lined up facing each other and fired upon their opponents until one 
party was sunk, boarded, surrendered or escaped the conflict.  Being upwind of the of 
opponent could be a tactical advantage because of better visibility, but it also committed 
a navy to an offensive battle, as it was much easier to break away and run if one was 
downwind of the opponent.  Because of this, the emphasis was on ships that carried the 
most guns, as that was the only way to gain an advantage in such a battle. 
Nelson decided that for the decisive victory that the British Navy was seeking, 
new organization had to be used.  The limiting factor in British tactics was the 
Admiralty’s insistence on the fleet organizing itself into a single line.  British admirals 
were expected to follow fighting instructions written in 1690 and those who didn’t 
sometimes found themselves court martialed.72 Ships were prohibited from breaking 
away from the line to pursue independent action in Article 20 of the permanent 
instructions, which stated that “None of the ships of the fleet shall pursue any small 
number of enemy’s ships till the main body be disabled or run”.73  This left a very limited 
role in battle for subordinate admirals who commanded divisions of the fleet.  
Subordinate admirals were directed to be attentive to the flagship, ensure the ships in the 
vicinity received the communications and ensure that nearby ships remained in 
formation.74  Trusting the experience of his subordinate, Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, 
Nelson decided to divide his fleet into two squadrons in order to pursue independent 
action in battle.  This is Nelson’s organizational innovation: dividing his fleet in two 
divisions and allowing for autonomous action.  This innovation would allow him to 
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“cross the T”, where a fleet could intercept an opposing fleet by crossing perpendicularly 
in the middle of the opponent’s line.  Nelson desired to “cross the T” in two places along 
the French line, dividing the fleet into thirds, so as to allow the dispersion of attacking 
vessels.  Crossing the T would allow the attacking vessels to “rake” the sides of their 
opponents’ ships from bow to stern while being protected from fire themselves, as the 
guns on warships were fixed and only allowed firing in two directions.  Once a ship 
broke through the line, the opponent could be attacked on both sides and surrounded.  
Unlike the better trained British fleet, most French and Spanish vessels were only 
prepared to fire from one side of the vessel at a time, so the opponent’s confusion as to 
which side to defend would give Nelson an additional advantage.75  This action would 
also isolate the enemy van (front of the line), effectively taking those ships out of action 
because they would have to head into the wind to rejoin the fight.  Using these tactics, it 
would be important for the British to take the offensive windward (upwind) side of their 
opponents, allowing them to maneuver quickly and take advantage of their superior 
seamanship.   
It was Napoleon’s threat to replace Admiral Villeneuve with his rival, Admiral 
Francois Rossily, which finally drove Villeneuve to action.  On the morning of 19 
October 1805, the Combined Fleet of French and Spanish warships left Toulon with 
thirty-three ships.76  A British frigate spotted them and Nelson was informed by mid-
morning.  He set off in the direction that the French were heading.  On the morning of 21 
October 1805, the British found themselves nine miles away from the combined fleet, off 
the shoals of Cape Trafalgar.  By mid-morning, Nelson had raised the signal “prepare for 
battle”.  
The night before the engagement, Nelson had hosted the commanding officers of 
all his ships on board the command ship to fully explain his ideas.  Good communications 
were key, as the reorganization of his fleet would make it difficult to signal once the 
battle began.  Because of the experience of his senior leaders and the loyalty of his 
wardrooms, Nelson’s instructions were carried out well.  The British took twenty ships of 
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the Combined Fleet.  Unfortunately, they only came home with four prize vessels, due to 
bad weather that hit immediately after the battle and the weakened condition of all ships 
involved.  It is estimated that the Combined Fleet lost 8,000 sailors while the Royal Navy 
suffered 437 dead and 1242 wounded.77 
Nelson’s victory at the Battle of Trafalgar was stunning, with a grave impact on 
the future of French-British relations.  From that point on, Napoleon had to abandon 
thoughts of invading Great Britain and focused his aggression on other continental 
powers.  Though Napoleonic France remained a continental power for several years, 
Nelson delivered a definite blow to the French navy.  What is most remarkable about this 
case is that even though there was no pressure on Nelson to innovate other than his own 
desire for a decisive victory, he innovated admirably.  It could be mentioned that the only 
form of innovation available to Nelson was organizational, as he did not personally have 
the capital to investigate technological innovation.  This organizational innovation was 
also unusual because it was within a military that had been successful in recent history.  
After all, the British navy had defeated the French in their last four engagements.78  Most 
militaries that innovate organizationally do so because recent losses demonstrated a need 
to the leadership for new organization.  It is a tribute to the military genius of Nelson that 
he recognized an opportunity for organizational innovation. 
C. THE BOER WAR 
The next case study is of a military that innovated organizationally because recent 
losses demonstrated a need for new organization.  The natives of Transvaal and the Free 
Orange State had all but lost a conventional war with the British, so an unfamiliar 
organization and a new approach to war were was chosen as the only viable alternatives.  
This is the case study of the Boer Commandos during the Boer War (1899- 1901).   
The Boer War began over the British desire to control the gold mines near 
Johannesburg in what was then Transvaal and add those territories to their colonial 
possessions.  Two nations, Transvaal and the Free Orange State combined forces to 
preserve the autonomy of their nations.  The Boers first sought diplomatically to limit the 
power of the “uitlanders”, or foreign whites, that flocked to their country.  The military 
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confrontation began in October of 1899.  The Boers mounted a traditional defense against 
the British, confident that their superior rifle, the German-made Mauser, horsemanship 
and marksmanship would overpower the British.  The Boers quickly invaded and sieged 
Mafcking, Kimberly and Ladysmith in an attempt to take the offensive.  Unfortunately, 
the massive number of British troops in the area negated these advantages quickly.  The 
strategy chosen by the Boers forced them into a conventional war with the British, where 
they could not use their mobility to their advantage.79   
The Boer military organization was unsuited for conventional warfare, which 
required a defined command structure.  The main unit of Boer combat organization was 
known as the Commando, which consisted of every man in an electoral district, of which 
there were over 40.  Because of the varying sizes of the electoral districts, Commandos 
ranged in size from 300 to 3,000.  Leaders were not professional military officers, but 
were rather elected by the members of each Commando.  Larger districts also elected 
field cornets.  Because of the ad-hoc nature of the force, traditional military discipline 
was unheard of, and troops were free to enter and leave the military as they saw fit.  
Similarly, there were no designated uniforms and soldiers were required to bring their 
own horses, weapons, ammunition, food and supplies.80 
For a time, the British strategy of advancing directly along the railroad lines 
allowed the Boers to maintain an advantage despite their ill-advised tactics and 
organization.  The Boers took positions on kopjes (small hills) and sniped the advancing 
British troops.  However, with the arrival of Field Marshal Lord Frederick Roberts in 
January 1900, the tide was turned.  By using flanking movements to disguise their 
actions, the British captured the capital of Orange Free State on 13 March 1900.  Field 
Marshall Roberts then captured Johannesburg on 30 May 1900 and Pretoria on 5 June 
1900.81  With the capture of the capitals complete, the British expected the Boers to agree 
to a complete surrender.  The majority of the Boer military leadership had been captured, 
killed in action or had left the county in disgrace.  The British had not expected a younger 
generation of military leadership would seize the opportunity to take charge and innovate 
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organizationally. 82 
The most influential of the new emerging leaders was Christiaan De Wet.  He 
recognized that the military strength of the Commando force lay in its mobility.  They 
could use their superior mobility to their advantage and attack lightly defended units with 
small bands of men, ranging in size from 50-300 men.  Each of these bands would be 
based in the district that they lived, allowing the soldiers to disperse after the action and 
return to their civilian lives.  With very few exceptions, soldiers did not travel outside of 
their home district or attempt any action with more than 300 men.  Because of this, most 
operations were independently undertaken.  Another change in the Commando 
organization was leaders were selected by experience as opposed to popular elections.  
Emerging leaders such as James Barry Hertzog, Koos de la Rey and Jan Smuts were 
selected because of tactical knowledge and battlefield experience, creating a more 
professional leadership.83  
The Boer strength varied during this phase of the war; as members could join and 
leave the army at will, but it never numbered more than 15,000.84  The guerilla tactics 
developed by De Wet focused on attacking the railroads that were used to supply the 
British troops.  The Boers destroyed the tracks, looted the supply trains and attacked the 
sentries designated to guard the tracks.  Between October 1900 and September 1901, the 
British rail lines were cut 195 times.85  Attacking the rail lines was beneficial for the Boer 
army for two reasons.  First, it separated the British from their supplies, as the lack of 
indigenous support meant that most of the British supplies had to travel great distances.  
Even though the British military adopted flanking movements, they still depended on a 
long supply train that began at the railheads.  Second, it provided the Boer army with the 
majority of their supplies.  Also, this sort of ambush was the attack that the Boer 
commandos excelled in.  As the war continued, the Boer commandoes abandoned their 
more accurate Mauser rifles and started using British Lee-Metford rifles because parts 
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and ammunition were readily available for the latter weapon.86  Since they had no ability 
to actually feed, cloth and house prisoners and because the Commandos were short on 
clothing, most captured soldiers were simply stripped of their possessions, including their 
clothing, and sent on their way.87 
The British spent a disproportionate amount of time and effort attempting to hunt 
down Commandos.  When a Boer party of 362 under the command of Jan Smuts crossed 
into South Africa to unite the Afrikaner population against the British, over 15,000 troops 
were designated to root out the infiltrators.88  The most remarkable Boer victory was one 
of the rare actions that engaged more than 300 men.  Lord Paul Sanford Metheun was 
leading a group of 1,300 troops and four guns that was attacked by 1,100 Boer 
commandos.  By first attacking the rear guard and then the right flank, Boer Commander 
Koos De La Rey wore down the British forces and achieved a remarkable victory.  The 
British forces lost 68 dead, 121 wounded and 600 captured, including General 
Meuthen.89  It was this victory that worried the British leadership and led to political 
concessions on their part. 
After this 3 March 1901 victory, Boer victories were few and far between.  The 
systematic construction of Blockhouses across the land by the British made it difficult for 
the commandos to travel freely.  Many Boers had been captured, injured, interned, 
conscripted into the British forces or decided to work in the mines to support their 
families.  On 15 May 1901, delegates of Transvaal and the Orange Free State met in 
Vereeniging, and on 31 May 1901 a truce was agreed upon.  Under the conditions of the 
peace, the Boers received responsible government, no war tax, no vote for the black 
natives, Afrikaans was to remain an official language and the Boers were allowed to keep 
their personal weapons.90  While this was not an out-and-out victory, as the Boers still 
had to swear allegiance to the British crown, the terms of the truce were an improvement 
over the unconditional surrender the British had demanded before the Boers innovated 
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organizationally and demonstrated their military effectiveness.  The Boers had shifted 
their focus from a conventional war, in which they were greatly outnumbered, as they 
never had more than 70,000 soldiers total and 25,000 troops in the field at any time 
against a force of 500,000 British troops (including colonials) to an unconventional, 
distributed war by means of organizational innovation.91  By dividing into smaller units 
permanently located in specific geographical areas, the Boers were able to sustain 
themselves and forced the British to negotiate. 
When one looks at the case of the Boer innovation, one wants to dismiss it by 
pointing out that the Boers were forced to innovate or cease existing.  They had no 
international support of any kind because nations were afraid of offending Great Britain, 
no national treasury to equip or train their army and a limited number of men and 
supplies available. 
D. ADOPTING THE CONVOY 
The next case to be examined is the British decision to use convoying techniques 
to protect shipping that was attacked by German U-boats during WWI.  The British navy 
had the resources and national infrastructure to choose between multiple solutions to the 
difficulties they faced.  Organizational innovation was chosen over technological 
innovation.   
The convoy is widely heralded as an operational solution to the submarine threat 
during both World Wars.92  It is curious to note that Kaiser Wilhelm II was as reluctant to 
engage in indiscriminant guerre de course (commerce raiding), as the British Admiralty 
was to adopt convoying as a defensive measure against the German U-boats.  After the 
commander of the U-9, Kapitan-leutnant Otto Weddigen, sank three British cruisers, 
H.M.S. Aboukir, H.M.S. Hogue and H.M.S. Cressy in one day on 22 September 1914, the 
German high command began to investigate the possibility of using the submarine to 
weaken the British resolve by commerce raiding.   
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After the Battles of Verdun (21 February 1916 – 18 December 1916) and the 
Somme (1 July 1916 – 18 November 1916) , the German High Command decided that no 
decisive victory could be achieved on land.  As their resources were quickly being 
depleted, they saw themselves with three remaining options.  The first was to sue for 
peace while terms of the agreement would be favorable to them, the second was to re-
open unrestricted submarine warfare and attempt to starve the British into submission and 
the last was surrender.  After the British rejected German overtures for peace, the second 
declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare was made on 29 January 1917 and took 
effect 1 February 1917.  The German submarine force proceeded to sink 4,837 merchant 
ships and 12,500,000 gross tons of shipping until the end of the war.93  
Great Britain had been feeling the stain of attacks on its shipping throughout the 
entire war.  However, there was great internal conflict about the proper solution to the 
submarine threat.  The Admiralty had adopted a primarily Mahanian view of naval 
warfare, and saw commerce raiding as a secondary effort.  The main thrust of a nation’s 
navy should be the battleship and the blue-water navy was the mantra of most of the 
Admiralty.94  Perhaps because the British had the resources to consider different forms of 
technology as a solution to the submarine threat was the reason they were so slow to 
adopt convoying as a solution. 
Several solutions were tried to ameliorate the submarine threat before the convoy 
system was adopted.  Starting in the spring of 1915, the Allies established a system of 
patrols and drift nets around the Mediterranean.  The nets were large steel contraptions 
meant to entangle and trap enemy submarines or force them to the surface where they 
could be spotted.  The shortage of steel in the Allied nations made this a particularly 
impractical solution.  Several destroyers were embarked on “sub-hunting” missions, a pet 
project of Admiral Jellicoe.  Many areas were mined to deter submarines.  In addition to 
these solutions, the Admiralty recalled to duty Admiral Sir John Fisher, who was tasked 
with reviewing suggestions and ASW inventions offered to the Admiralty by the public.  
40,000 inventions poured into his office, but not one was deemed practical enough to be 
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worthy of a trial.  Thus, the Admiralty decided that new technology was not the solution 
to the submarine threat for the foreseeable future.95 
The Admiralty resisted convoying for several different reasons.  It felt that 
convoying was old-fashioned and that modern technology had rendered this tactic 
obsolete.  The Admiralty was also concerned that convoying would require a force of 
several destroyers to one merchant vessel in order to be successful.  This stemmed from 
mistrust in the merchant marine’s ability to keep a tight formation and maneuver en 
masse effectively.  Because of this distrust, the Admiralty was convinced that it would 
require a massive fleet of destroyers to escort convoys, which they did not have at their 
disposal.  They were not inclined to detach any of the 100 destroyers attached to the 
Great Fleet resting at Scapa Flow.  Perhaps this is because as Mahanian disciples, they 
did not fully appreciate the importance of commerce and shipping to the war effort.  
There was also a concern with clogging local ports as ships waited for escorts.  The delay 
in shipping time would make convoying an undesirable option to businesses, it was 
claimed.  It was commonly thought that convoying would provide a richer target for 
submarines.  In fact, when the U-boat threat first emerged, the Admiralty endorsed the 
anti-convoy: sending merchant vessels alone in a multitude of different directions.96 
Not everyone in Great Britain felt the same way about convoying.  Lloyd George 
was an avid proponent of convoying, and once elected Prime Minister, used his position 
to advocate the use of convoys to the point of irreparably damaging his relationship with 
the Admiralty.97  Foreign merchants lost confidence in Britain’s ability to protect their 
vessels and demanded convoys a few months after the institution of unrestricted 
submarine warfare.  Therefore, trade to Scandinavia was convoyed several months before 
the Admiralty instituted universal convoying for all merchant vessels.   
Admiral William S. Sims, United States Navy, was appointed the U.S. liaison to 
Great Britain after the United States entered the war and advocated convoying after his 
arrival on 10 April 1917.  American support, both monetary and military, would be vital 
to the successful convoying effort.  But what actually convinced the Admiralty to 
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experiment with convoying was the desperation of their situation.  Twenty five percent of 
all commercial vessels venturing into international waters did not see their destination 
ports.  The feeling amongst many leaders was that Great Britain could not sustain the war 
effort much longer with such great shipping losses.  In the month of April 1917, alone, 
750,000 tons of shipping was lost.98   
One reason Lloyd George found himself so unpopular in the Admiralty was his 
research into “the organization of the Admiralty and more particularly of the War Staff, 
in connection with Anti-Submarine warfare” on his 30 April 1917 visit.99  The war 
cabinet approved his proposal for reorganization of the Admiralty and War Staff on 02 
May 1917.  Admiral Jellicoe became the Chief of Naval Staff, which gave him executive 
power, which he didn’t have while serving as the First Sea Lord.  The Second Sea Lord 
became the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, responsible for the Operations, Mobilization 
and Intelligence Divisions and well as the Signals Section and the Third Sea Lord became 
the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, responsible for the Trade, Anti-submarine Warfare 
and Minesweeping divisions as well as the newly formed Convoy Section.100 
The Convoy Section of the Trade Division was established at the Admiralty on 25 
June, with a staff of 10 officers.  In September of 1917, the section became the 
Mercantile Movements Division of the Naval Staff, with a significantly larger staff and 
no longer reported to the Trade Division.101  The Director of Mercantile Movements 
(Captain F.A. Whitehead, R.N.) was responsible to the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff.  
Mercantile Movements worked closely with the Naval Intelligence Division and with the 
Convoy Section of the Ministry of Shipping, its civilian counterpart.  The Convoy 
Section of the Ministry of Shipping was responsible for the employment, destination, 
cargo and bunkering of all ships requiring escort.  The Mercantile Movements Division 
was responsible for allocating the escorts, controlling the movements of the convoying 
ships from the their ports of assembly to their destinations, assigning routes, directing 
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passage, and giving orders for dispersal to avoid dangerous areas.  The Intelligence 
Division gave up to date information on the location and movement of U-boats.102 
On 21 May 1917, the Admiralty adopted universal convoying for all merchant 
shipping.103  Convoying immediately began to prove its worth.  In the two-week period 
prior to the first convoy sailing to Scandinavia, 114 vessels had sailed along the route, of 
which 38 vessels or 33 percent of the vessels were sunk.  In the two-week period after the 
adoption of universal convoying, 331 ships sailed under escort, of which only five were 
sunk.  More significantly, roughly the same numbers of U-boats were patrolling in the 
area during both time periods.104  The convoy had the added benefit of encouraging trade 
and removed the advantage of the offensive from the submarine attack.  To attack a 
convoy was to come across a prepared and armed enemy, so despite German High 
Command exercises to develop tactics to attack convoys, U-boats avoided convoys in 
favor of other targets.   
Though the Admiralty endorsed universal convoying, it never became a reality 
before the end of the war, and there were still several independently sailed vessels for U-
boats to attack.  Convoys were only approved for vessels that traveled at speeds between 
9 to 20 knots.  A few convoys were approved for slower vessels traveling 7-8 knots.105  
From February 1917 to October 1918, 84,545 ships convoyed across the Atlantic, of 
which, only 263 were sunk by U-boats.  Of the 48,861 ships that sailed independently 
during the same time period, 1,497 were sunk.  That means that independently sailing 
vessels accounted for 85.5% of all shipping losses after convoying was instituted, which 
was greatly disproportionate considering that independently sailing vessels constituted 
only one third of all ocean-going traffic during the same time period.106 
Many factors contributed to the Allied victory during WWI, but it is fair to say 
that the success of the convoy system was a great contributor.  It allowed Great Britain to 
receive the materials it needed to maintain the war effort.  The Economist of London 
editorialized that “Britain has come within very little of losing the war . . . . If the losses 
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of the British and Allied shipping had continued at the rate recorded for April, May and 
June 1917, the Germans would have won the war before the year closed”.107 One could 
argue that the Admiralty was forced to adopt the convoy system because of the gravity of 
the situation.  However, one cannot overlook the importance of the reorganization of the 
Royal Navy.  The reorganization forced the navy to accept and focus on convoying as a 
solution to merchant shipping losses.  The creation of the Mercantile Movements 
Division and close coordination between Naval Divisions, particularly the Naval 
Intelligence Division was an organizational innovation that saved mercantile shipping 
and allowed the British army to fight another day. 
E. 1918 GERMAN SPRING OFFENIVES 
The past three case studies have presented militaries that innovated 
organizationally and were remarkably successful.  However, not all organizational 
innovations are successful, and poorly organized forces can prove disastrous.  The final 
case study presented explores a military that innovated purely organizationally, and 
failed.  Leaders who did not fully embrace organizational innovation hindered General 
Erich Ludendorff’s storm troop squadrons in their efforts during the 1918 German spring 
offensives in WWI. 
In January 1918, the German High Command decided to take advantage of a 
fortuitous set of circumstances.  Russia had withdrawn from the war and settled with 
Germany and her allies.  This gave the Germans two advantages: for the first time since 
the beginning of the war, they controlled more divisions of men than their opponents and 
many divisions were now free to join the effort on the Western Front.  America had 
joined the war a few months earlier, promising millions of troops to reinforce the Allied 
effort.  However, there was a delay between the promise of troops and the delivery of 
them, as those troops needed to be drafted and trained.  The High Command decided to 
take advantage of this opportunity to switch from the strategic defensive to the strategic 
offensive.  
Early in the summer of 1916, the German army captured a French document 
entitled “The Attack in Position Warfare”.  It’s author, Captain André Laffargue, called 
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for infiltration tactics to be used by groupes de tirailleurs, troops armed with semi-
automatic weapons.  Their goal was to infiltrate the defensive zone as deeply as possible.  
Artillery bombardment during these efforts would be strong and cover the entire 
battlefield.  The idea behind the new offensive tactics was to attack where the enemy was 
weakest and follow up successes, not reinforce defeat by becoming a battering ram 
against strong forces.  If an obstacle was strong, forces would simply go around it.  The 
pace was to be determined by the fastest troop, not the slowest.  Commanding officers 
would have to resist the temptation to reform their troops after every obstacle, and instead 
allow uneven advances.108  The new tactics were enticing to General Erich Ludendorff, 
Third Army Supreme Commander, because they promised results that not yet been 
achieved in the course of the war, and depended on the same weapons used on the 
Western front for the last two years.109 
The German contribution to these new assault tactics was to pair them with a new 
organization.  They developed and trained Stosstruppen (Storm troops), ten or eleven 
man units armed with light machine guns, trench mortars, grenades and flamethrowers 
which were to be the backbone of the effort.  The Stosstruppen were then organized into 
70 attack divisions (Mob. Divisionen), which were separate from the regular, less well 
equipped divisions (Stellungsdivisionen).110  In order to insure that his leadership, 
company and battery commanders in particular, understood the dynamics of the new 
organization and tactics, Ludendorff organized a series of one month long schools in 
September 1916 (Feld-Kriesschulen).  Special training courses, held at Solesmes, were 
offered to General Staff officers and front commanders.  Nine schools were established to 
teach new artillery tactics.  It is unknown how many officers and non-commissioned 
officers went to these schools, but historians assume the attendance was high.111  The 
next two years were spent training and waiting for the appropriate time to use the new 
strategy and organization.  
                                                 
108 DJ Goodspeed, Ludendorff: Genius of World War I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966) 
243-244. 
109 Goodspeed, 243. 
110 Holger H. Herwig, “The Dynamics of Necessity: German Military Policy during the First World 
War”, Military Effectiveness, Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, ed. 101. 
111 Herwig, 101. 
45 
The first operation of the strategic offensive campaign was code-named Michael.  
General Erich Ludendorff, who was to command the campaign, favored attacking the 
sector between Arras and St. Quentin in France.  This was one of the weaker sectors, 
under the command of General Sir Hubert Gough, of whom it was euphemistically said 
that his “reputation was not for thoroughness”.112  He was in command of the Fifth 
Army, the smallest of General Douglas Haig’s four armies, which had been depleted 
during the Passchendaele offensive and had not fully recovered by 21 March 1918.  It 
was also the dividing point between the French and British armies, which Ludendorff felt 
he could exploit. 
At 4 a.m. on 21 March 1918, soldiers of the British Fifth Army awoke to a 
barrage of shelling, smoke, grenades and poisonous gas.  At 9:15 a.m., after British 
troops were sufficiently shell-shocked, German troops advanced.  By nightfall, the entire 
forward position over a stretch of nineteen miles had been lost.  On 27 March, the 
offensive reached Montdidier, a penetration of 40 miles into the enemy territory.  It was 
then that the offensive began to derail.  Due to a lack of command and control, German 
troops had taken to looting the countryside when they saw the bounty available.  Also, 
not all of Ludendorff’s commanders embraced the new storm-troop tactics.  General 
Below clung to more traditional tactics and caused many ill-afforded casualties.  
According to Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, Royal Army, Ludendorff “had sufficient 
receptiveness to see a new truth, but not sufficient elasticity or conviction to carry it out 
fully in practice”.113 This was in reference to his support of General Below’s attack of 
Arras, one of the more heavily defended areas.  Instead of bypassing Arras, as Storm-
troop tactics would have him do, General Ludendorff gave General Below six 
reinforcement divisions to break through this problem area.  This began a trend of 
Ludendorff’s to spend more troops than he had budgeted for each phase of his campaign.  
After Operation Michael ceased to gain further ground, Ludendorff launched 
Operation George.114  On 9 April 1918, the German army attacked again in Flanders, on 
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the coastline of the Lys River, using the same tactics as Operation Michael.  The 
objective was to secure the coastline of the English Channel behind Ypres, and force the 
British army to evacuate across the channel.  After blanketing the area with artillery and 
poisonous gas for several hours, the German army forced a tired Portuguese division to 
give up three miles of territory.  Ludendorff’s army captured Mt. Kemmel and 
Scherpenburg by 29 April, which were about 15 miles inland from the river.   
Ludendorff had expended more troops than he expected in Operation Michael, 
which forced him to scale back Operation George.  He then again spent more troops than 
he could afford, loosing 110,000 troops in Operation George.  Though he was gaining 
ground in each case, the reserves that Ludendorff could draw from were diminishing 
rapidly whereas American reinforcements were beginning to fill the Allied lines.  
Ludendorff attempted two more offensives, one of on the Chemin des Dames 
Ridge, where four French divisions and three English divisions came against forty-one 
divisions of the German crown prince’s army.  After bombardment early in the morning 
of 27 May 1918, the German forces managed to gain 30 miles, positioning themselves a 
mere 56 miles away from Paris in five days.  However, the German army quickly outran 
their artillery and supplies and fell once again to looting the countryside.  The 9 June 
attack on the Montdidier-Noyon sector of the Marne was anticipated, and the German 
forces met tough resistance.  The last significant offensive failed to reach the successes 
seen by the other three offensives, as the German army had lost the element of surprise.  
On 11 June 1918, Ludendorff was forced to suspend the offensive.  From then on, the 
German forces were too depleted to launch another successful attack.115 
One could argue that defeat was inevitable for the Germans.  They were depleted 
of men and resources and the threat of massive American reserves loomed on the 
horizon.  However, the Ludendorff offensives failed before massive numbers of 
American troops reached the European mainland.  The offensives failed for a number of 
reasons such as lack of supplies and weapons and overextended troops, but mostly 
because Ludendorff did not completely institute and follow his innovational strategy.  
Ludendorff squandered his reserves trying to break through heavily fortified areas instead 
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of flowing around and attacking the weaker points.  When the German Eighteenth Army 
had broken through the Allied Defense, Ludendorff held them back in and attempt to 
keep them even with Below’s troops.  It was when Ludendorff fell back on the tactics 
that had failed earlier in the war and failed to exploit his organizational innovation that 
his offensives finally failed. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Overall, militaries that innovated using pure organizational innovation fared 
rather well. Even the failed Ludendorff offensives gained significant ground before being 
repulsed.  It is ironic to think that most of the militaries with the resources to do so, such 
at the British Navy in WWI, attempted technological innovation before attempting 
organizational innovation.  The militaries that did not attempt technological innovation of 
any sort before organizational innovation, such as the Boers and German Army during 
WWI, only did so because they knew that technological innovation was not an option.   
Professor Sir Michael Howard is quoted as saying that “psychological change 
always lags behind technical change”.116  Likewise, organizational innovation lags 
behind technological innovation.  While this seems to be a natural tendency, it is not a 
rule as the previously discussed cases show.  One simply has to create an environment 
where innovative thinking is encouraged.  Admiral Nelson was well known for 
maintaining a good rapport with his junior officers.  However, the French Army during 
the interwar period actively discouraged independent thought, as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter.  The result was a military with no organizational innovation. 
This chapter has also shown the ability a few well-placed people in the right place 
at the right time to effect great changes that greatly improved their forces effectiveness.  
Nelson’s innovation organization of his fleet was influenced by a few naval philosophers, 
but was for the most part, a single person effort.  Lloyd George received support from 
politicians and members of the military, but the reorganization of the Admiralty was his 
directive.  What is most impressive about pure organizational innovation is the relatively 
small amount of time and resources it requires to create effective innovation. 
 
                                                 
































IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will explore case studies of militaries that innovated both 
organizationally and technologically.  The cases that will be explored are: the German 
army during the interwar period of the 1920’s and 1930’s with respect to its development 
of panzer divisions, German submarines during the same time period, the French naval 
Jeune École of the 19th century, American amphibious forces during the interwar period, 
and the recent American campaigns in Afghanistan.  
Three of the case studies presented are from the interwar period of the 1920’s and 
1930’s.  It is possible that the intense political environment of this period between world 
wars, when all nations knew that another major conflict was looming on the horizon, 
inspired militaries to take more risks.  Certainly, Germany, which had been economically, 
militarily and morally crushed by the impositions of the Versailles Treaty in the 1920’s, 
had little to lose.  This desperation would explain the drastic innovation the German 
military undertook in the interwar period.  If technological innovation alone proved to be 
marginally successful, and organizational innovation was generally more successful than 
not, would the combination of the two provide maximum benefits?  On the flip side, 
would the failure of such a strategy be even more devastating than the failure of 
organizational innovation alone or technological innovation alone? 
It is unlikely that militaries will innovate technologically and organizationally 
simultaneously.  Usually, one form of innovation will lead the other, the first creating the 
demand for the second.  Sometimes militaries advance technologically first, creating new 
technology and then considering new ways of employing said technology: new tactics, 
new operations and new strategy. Eventually the new strategy creates a demand for 
organizational innovation to become fully effective.  This bottom-up approach is popular 
in many militaries.  Other times, organizational innovation comes first, and technology is 
required to follow.  Therefore, the mini-case studies will be presented in this manner: first 
the militaries that innovated technologically and then organizationally will be examined; 
then the militaries that innovated organizationally and then technologically will be 
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examined.  The next three cases will be the German Panzer divisions during the interwar 
period, the German wolf packs during the same time and American Special Operations 
forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. 
B. GERMAN ARMORED DIVISON 
At the end of WWI, the German military was severely downsized.  The Treaty of 
Versailles limited the German army to ten divisions: three cavalry and seven infantry 
with a combined total of 100,000 troops by 31 March 1920.  The German High 
Command was dissolved and replaced by a less powerful body known as the 
Truppenamt.  All war material manufactured was to be reported to and controlled by a 
committee of representatives of Allied nations.  Article 171 of the treaty strictly 
prohibited: “The manufacture and the importation into Germany of armored cars, tanks 
and all similar constructions suitable for use in war….”.117 However, that did not prevent 
the German military from discussing tank tactics and creating a doctrine concerning the 
use of tanks.  
Most military theorists at the end of WWI agreed that tanks were to become a 
vital platform in future warfare.  The German military leadership was no different.  
Lieutenant Ernst Volckheim was one of German military tacticians who studied tank 
doctrine.118  His work would influence most of the tank officers in WWII.  His thoughts 
on anti-tank warfare and the need for radios in all tanks so that tanks could communicate 
not only with each other, but also with infantry and artillery units influenced the 
development of Blitzkrieg. Before the rise of Hitler, General Hans Von Seeckt, who 
served as chief of the Truppenamt until 1926, ordered that each unit designate an armor 
officer and insisted that mock tanks be included in military maneuvering.119  Though the 
mock tanks were often canvas and wood structures mounted on bicycles or steel 
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structures mounted on automobiles, Germany was designing and building a small number 
of real tanks secretly.120 
German military leadership in the 1920’s and 1930’s believed there would be 
roles in future wars for two types of tanks.  The first would be a light tank with an armor 
piercing guns (37mm) and two machine guns.  The other would be a medium tank, not to 
exceed 24 tons, with a large caliber gun (75mm) and two machine guns.  All tanks had a 
speed requirement of 25 m.p.h..  By 1933, all requirements for German tanks could be 
met, except their need for wireless communication.121  This capability was necessary for 
command and control centers to maintain contact with tanks, and avoid the situation that 
occured with Stosstruppen in the previous war, where the troops’ discipline dissolved 
once they were out of range of headquarters command and control. 
Historians James Corum and Robert Citino agree that Heinz Guderian’s role in 
tank development in the 1920’s and 1930’s is often over-emphasized as a result of his 
publication of Panzer Leader, Guderian’s account of armored warfare development in the 
German army.122   Guderian’s main contribution to armored warfare, according to Citino, 
was the creation and organization of Panzer divisions.123   
The rise of Adolf Hitler accelerated the tank development and its associated 
organizations.  His goals of German re-unification were even more expansive than the 
goals of the previous Weimar governments and he was in favor of military technology 
and organization that promised quick results.124  In July 1934 a Tank Forces Command 
(Kommando der Panzertruppen) was established, with Heinz Guderian serving as Chief 
of Staff.  The command was charged with continuing organizational and tactical 
experiments with armored forces.  The command also continued design work on the tanks 
themselves.  Designs were approved and orders were placed for the creation of 
Panzerkampfwagen(s) II, III, and IV by 1934, 1935, and 1936 respectively.  These were 
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the tanks that the German command would have in the field when WWII began three 
years later.   
After successful large-scale armored maneuvers at Münsterlager in the fall of 
1935, the first three panzer divisions came into existence in October 1935.125  Each 
panzer division had two tank regiments of two battalions each, with 128 
Panzerkampfwagens I per battalion.  Including command tanks, each panzer division had 
a total of 561 tanks.  There were also two battalions of motorized infantry, one 
motorcycle battalion, a motorized artillery regiment, a motorized antitank battalion, a 
motorized pioneer battalion and a motorized reconnaissance battalion.  According to 
Richard Ogorkiewicz, a panzer division was “a self-contained combined arms team in 
which tanks were backed up by other arms brought up, as far as possible, to the tanks’ 
standards of mobility”.126  The importance of combined arms was emphasized in German 
doctrine as early as the 1920’s when General Von Seeckt insisted that cadets and general 
staff officers be trained in and familiar with all branches of the Army.  Dominick 
Graham, scholar of British armored doctrine, believed that the German ability to combine 
tanks, guns and armored troops was critical to their success in northern Africa.127  This 
innovational organization is what separated the Germany panzer divisions from its 
contemporary British and French counterparts.  It allowed for the remarkable success of 
Blitzkrieg.128   
By 1940, elements of the German military had created a new doctrine, which 
became known as Blitzkrieg in western nations.  Blitzkrieg emphasized speed and 
mobility over firepower, though at decisive points, it aimed for a concentration of 
firepower using tanks, dive bombers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry.  Aircraft were 
used both offensively and defensively to prepare the way for advancing armor units.  
Like WWI doctrine, storm troop tactics were used.  Unlike WWI doctrine, military forces 
aimed to disorient the enemy’s command structure as much as it sought to destroy enemy 
troops.  To this effect, the doctrine encouraged deep penetrations into the enemy’s rear 
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areas.  Another improvement was the installation of radios in all tanks.  During the 
Ludendorff offensives at the end of WWI, troops quickly lost all discipline as soon as 
they were out of communication with senior leadership.  Blitzkrieg maintained discipline 
and allowed senior leaders to give guidance once objectives were reached. 
At the battle of France, the Germans had 1445 Panzerkampfwagen I’s, 1238 
Panzerkampwagen II’s, and several hundred more modern versions of the 
Panzerkampwagen for a total 3862 tanks, compared to France’s 4688 tanks.129  The 
average German tank on the Western front had a speed of 26.5 m.p.h. and a range of 110 
miles compared to 20.1 m.p.h. and 89 miles, the average speed and range of French tanks 
on the same front.130  Despite their numerical inferiority in tanks, the Germans had the 
advantage in combined arms firepower, bringing 2,600 88-mm flak guns and 6,700 light 
flak guns against France’s 1,500 flak guns of all types.131  The immediate success of 
blitzkrieg is uncontested.  The capture of Poland in four weeks and defeat of France in six 
weeks attest to its strength.  At the Battle of Sedan (14 May 1940) five panzer divisions 
overwhelmed four French armored divisions.  On the morning of 14 May 1940, fifty 
French tanks were destroyed on the battlefield, with minimal German losses.132 
Blitzkrieg doctrine looked at available modern technology and sought to 
maximize its potential.  While new tanks and aircraft were designed throughout the war, 
the doctrine was developed to fit the most modern technology available.  Likewise, the 
organizations of panzer divisions were continually adjusted according to the needs of 
campaign and available technology.133  This is an example of extremely successful 
bottom-up approach to military innovation.  As the technologies that could be exploited 
                                                 
128 Citino, 243-244. 
129 R. H. S. Stolfi, “Equipment for Victory in France in 1940,” History Vol. 55, No. 183, 6-8. 
130 Stolfi, 14. 
131 Stolfi, 203. 
132 Friedrich Wilhelm Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1956) 12-17. 
133 “Panzer Divisionen” 17 May 2002 http://www.feldgrau.com/heerpa.htm (09 June 2002).  This 
website documents 36 separate panzer divisions, their organizational and battle history throughout the 
course of WWII.  All panzer divisions underwent some organizational revision as the technologies that 
were available fluctuated through out the course of the war. 
54 
fluctuated, the German military adjusted their doctrine and organization to maximize 
their potential effectiveness. 
C. WOLF PACKS 
Another example of bottom-up interwar innovation is found within the German 
navy.  The navy had found relative success with submarines employed in commerce 
raiding during WWI.  The traditional navy didn’t fare as well, making only one major 
appearance at the Battle of Jutland, which was at best a draw.  Toward the end of WWI, 
submarine sorties became less effective because of the newly adopted policy of 
convoying merchant vessels.  The German High Command experimented with different 
tactics to overcome the new threat posed by convoys, including attacking a convoy with 
several submarines at once.134  While this strategy wasn’t adopted before the end of the 
war, it did catch the attention of then LCDR Karl Dönitz, who was to become ADM 
Dönitz, Submarine Force Commander and the father of wolf pack organization and 
tactics.  
The Versailles Treaty stipulated that Germany surrender all U-boats at “ports 
specified by the Allies and the United States” and scuttle any vessels that were not sea-
worthy.135  The German Navy continuously tried to subvert the terms of the agreement, 
with some success. Though attempts to hide U-boats after the treaty were unsuccessful, 
the German Navy did found the German Submarine Construction Office in April of 1922 
under the cover of the Dutch company NV Ingenieurskaantor voor Sheepsbouw.  In this 
manner, senior naval leadership kept abreast of the most recent developments in 
submarine technology.136  Similarly in violation of the Versailles Treaty, Mentor Bilatz, a 
quasi-private shipbuilding company built and tested German naval submarine designs by 
selling them to other nation’s navies, such as Japan, Turkey and Finland.137  A great 
volume of information was collected in that manner and prompted Reichwehrminister 
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(prime minister) Kurt von Scheicher to approve a plan to build 16 U-boats on 15 
November 1932.   
The following January, the National Socialists came into power and escalated 
military plans.  Hitler’s repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles on 16 March 1935, led to a 
new naval agreement with Great Britain that allowed Germany to construct a submarine 
force of 45% the mass tonnage of British submarine forces with provisions that allowed 
Germany to construct submarine force equal in mass tonnage to British submarine forces 
should “special circumstances” arise.138  Despite this provision, the German Navy only 
had 57 available U-boats at the start of WWII because of Hitler’s decision to give 
preference to the rearmament of the army over the navy and the navy’s expenditures on 
conventional surface ships.  
 The most common U-boat during WWII was the Type VII, of which 709 were 
commissioned before the end of the war.  The most common variation, the Type VIIC 
displaced 865 tons submerged, had a surface speed of 17.2 knots and a submerged speed 
of 8 knots, a surface range of 9,700 nautical miles (nm) on the surface and 90 nm 
submerged, had a diving depth of 328 ft, a crush depth of 656 ft and carried 14 torpedoes.  
Though its performance was not outstanding in any field, its all-around durability made it 
a valuable platform.  These platforms were a gradual improvement from their WWI 
ancestors, larger, faster, with more endurance, larger payloads and better communications 
ability. Several truly innovative U-boats were developed during the war years, such as the 
Type XXI which was the first contemporary submarine, a vessel faster and more 
maneuverable underwater than on the surface due to its’ streamlined hull design.139 
In the summer of 1938 Admiral Dönitz outlined the basis structure of the wolf 
pack, writing that the “essential effect against a gathering of steamers in convoy can only 
be realized when a great number of U-boats can be successfully set on the convoy . . . .  
This is conditional on the U-boat [that is] in touch with the convoy calling up the others 
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[U-boats].”140  Radio communications were to be central in wolf pack organization.  
Unlike the Battle of Jutland, the new organization of the German submarine force 
depended on the new information technology.  Because the wolf pack needed radio 
communications to make decisions, it was effectively used.  The inspirations for wolf 
pack tactics were several failed experiments by the U-boat command in the spring of 
1917.  The experiments attempted to coordinate several U-boats to attack a convoy at 
once, using radio communication.141  Admiral Dönitz was convinced that Great Britain 
would re-institute convoying once it perceived that unrestricted U-boat warfare was being 
used against it.  To counter this, he had two plans: to engage in aggressive but restricted 
warfare for as long as possible and to employ the newly developed wolf-pack 
organization and associated tactics.  The first plan, to engage in aggressive but restricted 
warfare, did not last long, as U-30 torpedoed the British passenger liner Athenia on 3 
September 1939 when the captain of the U-boat misidentified it as a troop transport 
vessel.142  Having anticipated the return of U-boat geurre de course, the Admiralty 
quickly re-instituted convoying. 
The first attempt at wolf pack organization on 17 October 1939 was unsuccessful.  
Nine boats were deployed to attack HG3, with Korvettenkäpitan Hartmann, Chief of the 
6th Flotilla on board U-37 acting as the wolf pack commander.  Of the nine boats that 
were sent to attack convoy HG3, only three actually made it to the convoy itself.  There 
were problems with malfunctioning torpedoes and it was determined that designating a 
commanding officer who traveled with the wolf pack was not an effective command and 
control mechanism.143  In response to these disappointing results, an inquiry was 
launched into torpedo production and the wolf pack organization was refined.  In the year 
between the first and second attempts at wolf pack organization and tactics, the U-boat 
force supported military operations in Scandinavia and targeted independently traveling 
ships. 
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 On 2 August 1940, Lorient became operational as the first of several U-boat bases 
on the coast of Biscay in France.  This meant that range of U-boats was extended several 
hundred miles, as vessels did not have to return to bases in Germany.144  Admiral Dönitz 
decided to centralize all U-boat operations in the U-boat head quarters of Chateau 
Kernival in Brittany.145  The goal of the wolf pack was to “locate the enemy, report his 
position and to attack him with the greatest number of U-boats”.146  U-boats would patrol 
in a designated area of the ocean, where intelligence indicated that convoys might be 
passing through.  Once a U-boat found a convoy, they were to radio their position and the 
convoy’s position to U-boat HQ in Lorient.  Dönitz would then alert all U-boats in the 
area of the convoy’s presence.  Dönitz felt that the benefits to be gained from centralized 
coordination and organization would outweigh the threats of radio directional searches 
that breaking radio silence would incur.   
Wolf pack organization was remarkably successful. When enough U-boats could 
be mobilized to attack a convoy, the results were deadly.  Convoy HX72 lost 11 ships and 
another two were damaged, resulting in a loss of 72,727 tons of shipping on 21/22 
September 1940. Convoy SC7 lost 20 ships in October of the same year, and HX79 lost 
12 ships in the same month.147 Forty three percent of ships that began a convoy in the 
months of November 1940 to March 1941 did not reach their final destination.148  In 
1942, the average monthly sinking rate of ships was 512,456 tons a month.149  Admiral 
Dönitz estimated that 900 thousand tons of shipping would have to be sunk each month 
to overwhelm Allied ship building capabilities.  This was never achieved, partly because 
a very small number of U-boats were actively patrolling at any time compared to WWI 
and partly because Allied submarine detection technology outpaced German counter-
detection technology.  Once the Naval Enigma codes were broken, the Allies knew the 
location of every U-boat in the fleet and could attack them rapidly.  The centralized 
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control of the U-boat service helped the Allies in their information gathering efforts.  By 
1943, Admiral Dönitz had temporarily cancelled all U-boat operations in the Atlantic. 
The U-boat campaign was an example of a moderately successful military 
innovation involving both innovative technology and organization.  However, some of 
the new technology eventually betrayed the organization.  According to historian David 
Kahn, the Enigma coding machine was vital to U-boat operations and its compromise 
doomed the organization.150  The wolf pack organization operated under the premise that 
the U-boat would be undetected until it was in range to attack, which was true while wolf 
pack attacks were successful.  When Allied detection technology outpaced German 
counter detection technology, the wolf pack became the hunted as opposed to the hunter.  
What this case suggests is that an organization that outpaces the technology available is 
equally as ineffective as technology that outpaces the organization.  Unbeknownst to 
Dönitz, he had created an organization to maximize the effective of his U-boats and 
found that the organization he had designed required technological innovation not in 
hand. 
D. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
Another, more recent example of organizational and technological innovation are 
recent American operations in Afghanistan.  While the WWII era examples focused on 
using technology to mass personnel and firepower on target, the more modern variations 
of this type of combined innovation have used technology to distribute forces while still 
massing firepower on target.  This case may not be as complete as the previous cases 
because the situation is on going and some of the information is closely guarded.  Also, 
hindsight is 20/20, some information contradicts itself and will only be clarified through 
the perspective that times brings. 
The 11 September 2001 attacks caught America by surprise, as the nation had felt  
impervious to attacks on its homeland.  Al-Qaeda’s networked organization had been 
designed to subvert America’s strengths as a military power and exploit its weaknesses as 
an open society.  Al-Qaeda operatives used portable satellites, Internet communications, 
cryptography, steganography and other advanced technologies. After determining that 
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Al-Qaeda was sheltered and aided by the ruling party of Afghanistan, military retaliation 
began. 
Futurist Alvin Toffler claims that American is currently poised on the cusp 
between Second Wave and Third Wave civilizations.  Second wave civilizations are 
defined by industrialization, the standardization of products, routines and education and 
the centralization of power.  Third Wave civilizations take advantage of improved 
information technologies to break down large bureaucracies and disperse information.  
The ability to communicate over long distances and the gradual shift of the economy 
from a production-based system to a service-based system allows people to spread out, 
and become more independent.  This lack of proximity to specialists will also prompt the 
return of “the-jack-of-all-trades” and workers who are skilled in more than one area.  In 
the same manner, modern military operations have followed suit, which is especially 
clear in Operation Enduring Freedom.151 
On 7 October 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the 
beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, while US warplanes were attacking key 
infrastructure and communications nodes.152  Operation Enduring Freedom began in 
what political consultant Dick Morris calls the “Clinton Doctrine that kept military efforts 
airborne and barred the use of ground troops…until after the aerial bombardment had 
neutralized the enemy.”153  After a few weeks of strategic bombing returned little in the 
way of new information or concessions by the Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, the 
operation gradually shifted to the “Rumsfeld doctrine”.  The Rumsfeld doctrine stresses 
coordination “among native ground power forces, U.S. Special Forces and commandoes, 
and American air power.”154   
Ground troops working in small units joined forces with Northern Alliance 
soldiers and participated in small, packetized attacks.  The attacks used a strange 
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combination of high tech and low-tech gadgetry.  Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz presented the following except from a U.S. ground troop’s letter at the 
Fletcher Conference: "I am advising a man on how to best employ light infantry and 
horse cavalry in the attack against Taliban T-55s (tanks) ... mortars, artillery, personnel 
carriers and machine guns -- a tactic which I think became outdated with the introduction 
of the Gatling gun.”155  The American forces that rode horses with the Northern Alliance 
were Army Special Forces, known as green berets.  They are organized into twelve man 
units, with one officer and eleven senior enlisted personnel.  Like the Toffler’s third wave 
jack-of-all-trades, members of the green berets are trained in weapons, communications, 
foreign languages, combat engineering and combat medicine.156  The Northern Alliance 
is a closely linked association of several warlords, each of whom commands the loyalty 
of several thousand guerrilla fighters.  The organizational innovation was not in the either 
the Northern Alliance or the Special Forces community, but in the collaboration between 
the two.  In recent American military engagements, either large numbers of forces were 
established on the ground in the area of operations (such as Vietnam or the Gulf War) or 
no forces were established on the ground at all (retaliatory strikes against Iraq and 
Kosovo).  By sending a small number of troops into Afghanistan, the U.S. military struck 
the balance between having no ground support and supporting a large military operation.  
Unlike Somalia, American forces were integrated with Afghan forces as opposed to 
associated with Afghan forces.  This integration allowed for the introduction of American 
technology and air power into many of the Northern Alliance actions and allowed 
American forces to guide the Northern Alliance in missions that were important to 
American interests.    
After three weeks of operations with ground troops, Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem 
announced at a Pentagon press conference that friendly forces controlled two thirds of 
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Afghanistan.157  By the beginning of December, a number of Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
fighters were in US custody.158 
At the same time, Operation Enduring Freedom has validated the Predator 
missile, which made news by being the first independently launched (i.e. launched from 
platform where no human input was possible) missile. On 27 Feb 2002, the Air Force’s 
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle successfully aimed and fired a Hellfire-C laser guided 
missile at a stationary target and allegedly proved the viability of this option.159  Earlier 
exploratory tests had been conducted at Indian Springs, Nevada on 16 and 21 February 
2001.160 Previously, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) had been used solely for 
surveillance reasons, due to the desire to maintain a “human in the loop” in stressful 
situations where experienced pilot judgment might be necessary.  These tests came at the 
urging of CIA officials who were frustrated with the time delay between surveillance 
taken by the Predators indicating a viable target and the prosecution of said target.  Often, 
this delay meant the loss of targets of opportunity.  Other innovative technologies used 
were laser-guided munitions, heat signature readers, GPS and portable satellite 
communications.   
This is clearly a case of technological innovation leading organizational 
innovation.  The U.S. military was frustrated that their advanced technologies were not 
yielding the results desired.  By allowing the collaboration between U.S. Special Forces 
and Northern Alliance troops, modern U.S. military technology was more effectively 
used.  Though the Special Operations Forces had been working on the ability to conduct 
this sort of operation for a while, military doctrine and hence, organization had not 
allowed it until Operation Enduring Freedom.   
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So far, this seems to be a successful mix of organizational and technological 
innovation.  Within days of small units of Marines being placed in Afghanistan, Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda fighters were captured and intelligence on senior leaders increased greatly.  
By successfully integrating small special operations units into indigenous forces and 
commanding joint air power, the United States has managed to create an organizational 
innovation that exploits both the most modern technologies and retrograde technology 
such as cavalry units.  This case is a strong indicator that a properly organized force can 
exploit a wide range of technologies and tactics. 
E. JEUNE ÉCOLE 
The next two case studies involve militaries that innovated in a top-down manner, 
first identifying a new role for the military, then creating an organization to assume that 
role and finally, developing doctrine, tactics and technology for the organization.  The 
French Jeune École was unsuccessful in its attempts to innovate, while American 
amphibious doctrine was wildly successful.  
After the loss of the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1871), the French navy was 
forced to reevaluate their role in the national security plans.  Since the loss of the war, the 
main threat to their security was Germany, a continental power, not Great Britain, a naval 
power.  The navy had contributed little to the recent war efforts: garrison duty in Paris 
and an unsuccessful blockade of the German coast.161  Inspired by the successful 
blockade of the Confederate coast during the Civil War, the French Jeune École emerged 
as proponents of a smaller, more mobile navy.  The premise of the Jeune École school of 
thought was that no navy was powerful enough to directly counter the threat posed by the 
Royal Navy.  Instead of attempting a futile race for larger, faster, better ships; a nation 
could develop an advantage over the Royal Navy by exploiting their weaknesses, namely 
their dependence on foreign food and raw materials. 
The leader of the Jeune École movement was Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-
Theophile Aube, who was the minister of the Marine from 7 January 1886 to 30 May 
1887.  The majority of Admiral Aube’s time in the Navy was spent overseas, protecting 
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French colonial interests and which greatly influenced his doctrine.  Aube identified three 
major threats to French interests: Italy, Germany and Great Britain, and proposed 
different naval strategies for each nation.   
It is Aube’s ideas for the defense of France against Great Britain that defined the 
ideas of the Jeune École and became the source of lively debate in the French navy.  
Great Britain, the traditional enemy of France, could be conquered by ruthlessly attacking 
British merchant shipping.  A large fleet consisting of torpedo boats, gunboats and boats 
with rams would accomplish this.  The common thought amongst officers of the Jeune 
École was that “the principle vice of the iron-clads is the attempt to combine in them at 
one time all of the means of naval warfare: the ram, the gun and the torpedo.  The result 
is that they are not really suited to use any of them.”162  A navy of many small vessels 
would allow the navy to disperse in many directions, but “thanks to steam and the electric 
telegraph, meet at a fixed hour at a rendezvous assigned to them at the last minute” and 
ensure numerical superiority.163  According to historian Theodore Ropp, “No idea in 
Aube’s writings is more important than this claim that it was possible to ensure 
momentary superiority, even on the High Seas, by a combination of forces from a number 
of Naval bases.”164   
Since torpedo boats and gunboats (vessels with a single cannon) would be lightly 
defended, if at all, torpedo boat operations necessarily differed from the conventional 
laws of maritime war.  In order for a torpedo boat to successfully attack its target, it 
couldn’t announce its presence and demand surrender.   By attacking at night where poor 
visibility would disguise the torpedo boat, and using the element of surprise, a small 
vessel could easily attack a larger vessel and quickly disappear into the night. 
Admiral Aube did not reorganize the navy’s administration, though he did cause 
great turnover in senior leadership.  He reduce the mandatory retirement age limits, threw 
out most of the officers on the Navy’s Paris staff, and most of the Bureau Chiefs.  He 
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then requested special credit of 200 million francs for a building program that included 
six large and ten small cruisers, twenty large torpedo boats, fifty gun-boats, one hundred 
regular torpedo boats and three armored coast defense ships to use as mother torpedo 
boats that would shelter and supply the smaller vessels.  This program was reduced in 
size as it made its way through the approval process.  The resultant building program 
included three large cruisers, two medium sized cruisers, six small cruisers and twenty-
one torpedo boats.165 
Unfortunately, the Jeune École’s doctrine and its concept of a dispersed 
organization was more advanced than the technology available at the time.  Building 
“cheap” vessels, the appropriate research and development was not designated and most 
of the vessels proved to be unseaworthy.  In April 1886, Aube ordered the construction of 
an experimental gunboat named after a close friend, Gabriel Charmes.  The Gabriel 
Charmes was a thirty-five meter torpedo boat carrying one 5.5 inch gun.  Because of the 
instability of the platform, the gun’s accuracy left much to be desired and was dropped 
from the building program.   
According to the Jeune École doctrine, torpedo boats were to be autonomous.  To 
test this claim, torpedo boat No. 61 set out across the Bay of Biscay in February 1886.  
The journey was made safely, though the quality of life was not tolerable for more than a 
few days.  Crews suffered from seasickness and fatigue.  According to one participant:  
As a rule, we lived on hams, sardines, and tinned soups; for the most of time the weather 
was so rough that it was as much as we could do to get a little water boiled.  We had a table 
about 18 inches wide, but there was no point in laying it, for nothing would stay on it.  The usual 
plan was for one man to hold the sardine tin while the other picked out sardines by their tails and 
transferred them to his mouth.166  
The idea of an autonomous torpedo vessel was also quickly discarded.   
Tests did show that torpedo boats were capable of breaking blockades.  Torpedo 
boats surprised the designated blockade runner cruiser 8 times, came within firing range 
21 times and made 126 surprise appearances during the course of the experiment.167 
Other positive developments were the design of more effective torpedoes and explosives 
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and the development of first French submersible vessel, which was built after Aube 
recognized the role for the submarine and awarded a contract for its construction. 
The role for the torpedo boat was limited and ultimately disappeared with the 
introduction of the dreadnought.  Similar concepts espoused by the Jeune École reappear 
occasionally, including the nearly successful German U-boat doctrine during WWI, and 
the “street-fighter” program of the U.S. Navy.  The torpedo boats of the nineteenth 
century have developed into the versatile modern day destroyers.168  Like the next case to 
be examined, U.S. amphibious doctrine, the Jeune École required that technology be 
developed to fit its doctrine.  Unlike U.S. amphibious doctrine, research and development 
allocated to the new technology was insufficient.   
F. AMERICAN AMPHIBIOUS DEVELOPMENT 
The development of American amphibious doctrine between WWI and WWII is 
another example of interwar innovation.169  In 1919, the United States returned to its 
isolationist policies.  The largest perceived threat to US interests was Japan, due to the 
United States’ role as protector of China and governor of the Philippines.  Color-coded 
war plans were developed, outlining different threats to US interests, with ORANGE 
designated as the naval plan to cope with the Japanese threat.  After 1919 the military 
services focused on war plan ORANGE to guide force development; because of the broad 
nature of the plan, each service could justify most of its spending as vital to the 
prosecution of the plan.  In 1920, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General 
John A. Lejeune, realized the importance of amphibious assaults to the success of war 
plan ORANGE.  A staff officer, Major Earl H. Ellis, USMC, wrote Operations Plan 712 
“Advanced Base Force Operations in Micronesia,” which Lejeune endorsed as the basis 
for all future Marine Corps training.170 
The Marine Corps’ focus on the development of amphibious doctrine resulted 
from a combination of many factors.  The Army was constantly threatening to absorb the 
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Marine Corps, and during the Great Depression congressional allocations for the military 
were scarce.  By taking the lead in developing amphibious doctrine, the Marine Corps 
was creating a permanent role for themselves and assuring their independence as a 
service.  The Navy and Marine Corps attempted their first landing exercise in 1922 with 
two companies of Marines at Culebra and Guantanamo Bay.  The next two exercises 
were in 1924 and 1925.  Because of the various missions assigned to them, Marine Corps 
leadership found it difficult to focus on amphibious doctrine development.  The 1926 
offensive landing exercises were extremely limited because the Marines that were to 
participate in the exercises were instead deployed to guard U.S. mail, and operations in 
China and Nicaragua.171   
 It became clear that if the Marine Corps did not prioritize amphibious warfare 
development, they would never develop the capability.  Under their current organization, 
the development of amphibious doctrine would always be a secondary concern.  Major 
General John H. Russell, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, pushed for the 
creation of the Fleet Marine Force.  This force would be included in the naval fleet 
organization and subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.  His 
suggestion led to the establishment of a new branch of the Marine Corps, ordered by 
Navy Department General Order No. 241 on 8 December 1933.172  The Fleet Marine 
Force would be maintained in a state of readiness for operations with the fleet and had the 
specific mission of executing landing operations.  They would not be used for garrison 
duty, counter-guerrilla operations, base defense or the myriad of other missions 
performed by the Marine Corps.173 
 The creation of the Fleet Marine Force was the catalyst for the rapid development 
of amphibious doctrine.  Commandant of the Marine Corps General Ben H. Fuller 
explained to his senior commanders that FMF (Fleet Marine Force) development would 
be the Marine Corps’ first priority.  It would not do to have a branch of the service 
without firmly established doctrine and roles for it.174  In late 1933, when plans for a 
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landing operations manual were disrupted by the lack of personnel due to the 
mobilization of a Marine regiment for Cuban duty, the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
Schools recommended that all classes be suspended and that students and faculty dedicate 
their time to creating said manual.175  The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations of 
1934 eventually became Fleet Training Publication 167 (1938), the doctrine for the 
conduct of amphibious operations.    
In 1934, General John H. Russell was appointed Commandant of the Marine 
Corps and continued the service’s drive to develop the FMF.  He reestablished the Fleet 
landing exercises to test and refine the doctrine established in Tentative Manual for 
Landing Operations.  Many variations of the amphibious assault were investigated: day 
and nighttime landings, smokescreens, an variety of naval and close air support, 
concentrated assaults and dispersed infiltration, different weapons, and the use of feints, 
demonstrations and deception. It was determined that a successful amphibious assault 
would isolate the target area and bombard the defenders with naval gunfire and close air 
support.  The landing would require a combined arms team to assault the beach over a 
broad front of over 1000 yards and would need rapid reinforcement with artillery and 
tanks.  Threats to a successful amphibious landing included combined air and naval 
counter-attacks and a counter-landing effort.   
One of the most consistent criticisms of the FLEXs (fleet landing exercises) was 
the difficulty in transporting all the necessary equipment.  In order to transfer men and 
equipment from larger transport ships to shore, smaller boats with shallow drafts had to 
be developed.  Once they were developed, the boats themselves needed transportation to 
the theater of operation.  While amphibious doctrine was in the final stages of 
development, appropriate transportation was embryonic.  
 In 1939, the Navy and Marine Corps tested Andrew Higgins’ Eureka boats as 
possible transport.176  The shallow draft vessels were designed to travel around the 
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Louisiana bayou and were easy to pull to shore and re-launch.  They were remarkably 
powerful, even when enlarged to meet Army specs.  In April of 1941, Higgins modified 
his boats by adding a landing ramp in the bow.  This design idea was taken from the 
Japanese landing boat Dai-Hatsu, 14M type.177  This would not be the only design that 
the American military copied from the Japanese Navy.  In order to transport the Eureka 
boats, the Navy copied the Japanese design of Shinsu-maru, which was the inspiration for 
modern day LHA and LHD class ships.  The Shinsu-maru had a well deck, which could 
be flooded with water.  From there, the smaller transport boats could simply float off the 
ships into littoral areas.  The first LST was commissioned in 1942 and the first LSD was 
commissioned in 1943.  Further modifications were made in 1941 so that “Eureka” boats 
could be accommodated by LSTs (landing ship tank) and LSDs (dock landing ship). 
 Other technical developments prodded by the development of amphibious 
doctrine were a larger version of the Eureka, designed to transport tanks ashore.  
Amphibians, tanks that bridged the gap between where boats could operate and car 
engines stalled out, were also developed.  The “alligator”, which became the United 
State’s main amphibian, was developed as a rescue vehicle after financier John A. 
Roebling was shocked by the devastation of a Florida hurricane.178  It eventually became 
the LVT (Landing Vehicle Tracked) that was used throughout the war.  
The success of the amphibious campaigns is well known.  The island hopping 
campaigns in the Pacific and D-Day off the coast of Normandy are amongst the famous 
WWII campaigns.  In fact, neither the German nor Japanese militaries ever successfully 
repulsed an American amphibious operation.  The ability to launch a highly organized 
amphibious assault remains one of the United States operational strengths today.   
Several differences are apparent between the two cases that innovated using a top-
down approach.  The French navy never created a separate organization whose primary 
task was the development of Jeune École doctrine and technology.  Because of this, the 
French navy remained mired in larger doctrinal arguments and the few experiments 
performed were hastily planned.  The Marine Corps’ equivalent to the French naval 
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experiments of 1886 were the FLEXs executed in 1922, 1924 and 1925.  None of these 
experiments were overwhelmingly successful either, and tended to emphasize the need 
for new technology and doctrine.  However, with the creation of the FMF, the Marine 
Corps was able spend the time and effort necessary to develop a successful new 
amphibious assault capability. 
G. CONCLUSION 
What the past few case studies have shown is that a combination of technological 
and organizational innovation can yield enormous results.  By innovating both 
technologically and organizationally, and military incurs greater risk but could also 
achieve greater results.  However, it is important to ensure that technological innovation 
does not outpace organizational innovation and that organizational innovation does not 
outpace technological innovation.  When the development of technology and doctrine are 
nearly simultaneous, such as in Operation Enduring Freedom and Blitzkrieg doctrine, the 
results are quite successful.  When technological innovation lags behind, as it did in the 
development of American amphibious capabilities and German wolf packs, military 
effectiveness suffers.  In the case of American amphibious operations, eventually 
technology caught up with the FMF and allowed victory.  Germany was not afforded to 
opportunity to allow the technology catch up to their organization and therefore faltered 
when Allied technological innovation outpaced them.  The Jeune École, a prescient naval 
organization and strategy that was not feasible with its contemporary technology, was 
partially redeemed by the near success of German U-boat operations during WWI.179 
Technological and organizational innovation cannot be successful without the 
support and contributions of many individuals.  However, it often seems that most 
influential person in the creation of a successful organizational innovation receives most 
of the credit for the success of the whole.  For example, Heinz Guderian’s main 
contribution to the Germany military between WWI and WWII was the establishment of 
the panzer divisions.  However, he is often credited with the successes of blitzkrieg 
doctrine.  Likewise, Admiral Dönitz is remembered as the father of wolf pack tactics, 
when his main contribution was the organization of the U-boat command.  While he did 
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work on wolf packs doctrine and tactics, he was originally inspired by an exercise held by 
the German High Command in 1918.  Futurists such as the Tofflers and analysts John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have advocated several key aspects of the Rumsfeld 
doctrine for several years before they were utilized.  No combined organizational and 
technology innovation is ever the work of only one person.  This is not to marginalize the 
role that these individuals played in their respective military’s developments, however the 
individuals most responsible for organizational innovation often receive the majority of 
the credit for successful technological and organizational innovations. 
Perhaps this is subconscious recognition of the importance of organizational 
structure to military effectiveness.  Especially in a top-down approach, organizational 
innovation is vital to the development of doctrine, strategy, tactics and technology, as 
shown by the Marine Corps in the interwar period.  In the bottom-up approach to 
technological and organizational innovation, new organizations allow technology to be 
used in innovative manners. 
 These cases show that when operational innovation and technological innovation 
work harmoniously together, remarkable results are achieved.  Blitzkrieg conquered in 
four weeks what Germany had failed to do for fours years during WWI.  Results were 
seen immediately after the adoption of the Rumsfeld doctrine in Afghanistan.  Innovating 
both technologically and operationally can bring quick results that technological 







Friedrich Von Bernhardi suggested that learning from past experiences was 
beneficial to militaries, but establishing hard and fast rules was not.180  This begs the 
question: what can be learned from all of these historical examples of militaries 
attempting to innovate?  The overarching lessons are these: technological innovation is 
overrated as a source of military effectiveness; organizational innovation is underrated as 
a source of military effectiveness; the best results stem from innovations in both 
organization and technology.   
B. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
Technology is only as effective as the person using it.  The machine gun proved 
its destructive power and military value during the Anglo-Zulu wars and again during 
WWI.  However, machine guns were devastated and destroyed eight years prior to the 
Anglo-Zulu wars, during the Franco-Prussian War (1870- 1871).  There, misdesignated 
as part of the artillery instead of the infantry, the machine gun failed to aid the French 
military efforts.  The Montigny mitrailleuse, a crank-operated machine gun, was mounted 
on an artillery carriage and unveiled as the French army’s secret weapon.181  The French 
army then reorganized its artillery into regiments of two six-gun batteries and a third 
battery of ten mitrailleuses.  LTC G.S. Hutchinson, Royal Army, claimed that “the 
organization of the mitrailleuses was equivalent to a reduction of the French Artillery by 
one third”.182  At the battles of Wissembourg (4 August 1870) and Spicheren (6 August 
1870), the mitrailleuses were destroyed by Prussian artillery before they had a chance to 
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fire, due to their limited range.  The machine gun was also falsely identified as an 
artillery piece during the American Civil War.  There, the machine gun was primarily 
used to guard bridges and other strategic points far from the primary battlefields.  This 
was also partially due to commanding officers’ lack of familiarity with the weapon.183  
The example of the French army shows that technological innovation can encourage 
detrimental organizational innovation, which contributed to the French loss during the 
Franco-Prussian War. 
A military’s ability to establish power in an area of operations increases over time 
and decreases over space, but the amount of power projected can be affected by the 
introduction of new technologies.  It is important to realize what aspect of this time-
space-power continuum new technologies will affect.  It is a common mistake to 
misidentify the nature of a new technology.  For example, the French saw the tank only 
as a weapon during the interwar period of the 1920’s and 1930’s, as opposed to a new 
form of transportation of weapons.  Therefore, the French army strove to create tanks 
with heavy guns and armor.184  The Germans, however, saw the tank as both a weapon 
and a new mobile platform and strove to design tanks that were quick, maneuverable and 
had great range.185  The result of the conflict between the two armies is well known.   
New technology alone can only incrementally improve performance on the 
battlefield, by creating a weapon that shoots farther, flies faster or has more armament.  
However, the second chapter showed that new information technology is often useless 
without a new organization that allows it to be used to its fullest potential.  Colonel John 
Boyd USAF lectured about the decision-making loop which eventually became the 
“OODA Loop”.  He claimed that “operating at a faster tempo or rhythm than adversaries” 
would make the faster force “appear ambiguous and thereby generate confusion and 
disorder among adversaries”.186  He then examined historical examples from the days of 
antiquity, Napoleonic wars, German blitzkrieg and modern guerrilla campaigns to 
illustrate his point.  If one’s decision-making loop could operate more quickly and 
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efficiently than the opponent’s then the opponent would be overwhelmed because of his 
inability to keep pace with latest developments in the conflict.187  If the organization only 
requires a certain level of information before acting, new information and communication 
abilities will either be ignored or slow down the decision-making process by contributing 
to information overload.  By coupling a communication and sensing technology with an 
incompatible organization, one is either slowing down the decision making cycle by 
overloading the organization or wasting time and money on an unused technology.  In a 
similar vein, new communication and sensing technology is most likely to illuminate the 
need for and allow new organizational systems to develop.  According to Boyd, by 
having a faster decision making process than the enemy, one could gain a distinct 
advantage that could overcome several other weaknesses, such as a smaller number of 
forces.188   
This faster decision-making loop could be one reason that networked terrorist 
organizations have been so successful recently.  By allowing multiple simultaneous 
decision cycles at once, the enemy is overwhelmed.  The point is this: if advanced 
technology is not necessary to the mission or how the organization operates, it often 
becomes a liability.  For example, Force XXI brought two complete command and 
control systems with them during their first battle experiments.  Setting up the redundant 
system became a liability as more troops were needed to maintain the system and negated 
the stated goal of creating a “smaller footprint”.  Troops needed to carry more equipment 
to operate both command and control systems, as opposed to the stated goal of being 
lighter and more mobile.  The Royal Navy’s organization with respect to the organization 
of operational fleets had changed little since the Battle of Trafalgar when it met the 
German navy at the Battle of Jutland 111 years later.  They ignored their new 
communications capability because it did not fit their current organization and therefore 
suffered some damage that could have been avoided with the organizational changes 
necessary to encourage the use of the radio. 
A concern that many militaries overlook is that technology is easy to copy.  Many 
militaries take the approach of “late modernization,” where another military’s technology 
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is copied and improved upon once the public is made aware of it.189  This saves the late 
modernizing nation much of the research and development cost and allows them to profit 
from the mistakes made by other militaries.  For example, some of the American 
technology used during the island-hopping campaigns of WWII was initially copied from 
Japanese naval designs.190  Once technology has been copied, it is often employed to 
negate the advantage that new technology originally presented to the innovative 
combatant and simply creates a war of attrition.  The German use of chemicals during 
WWI is an example of this.  Once the French and British began to use chemical weapons 
in the same manner as the German army, the benefit to the Germans of employing their 
new weapon diminished greatly.  The main result of chemical warfare was the increase in 
horrific casualties and its non-use in WWII. 
It is never a wise strategy to employ new technology assuming that the enemy 
will never be able to attain the technologically advanced weapon.  He usually does so, if 
he has enough time.  Even the Zulu tribesmen during the Anglo-Zulu wars managed to 
capture a few machine guns.  The majority of the impoverished Boer Commandos’ 
arsenal and ammunition was gleaned from British soldiers.  Nuclear weapons have found 
their way into the arsenals of impoverished nations and possibly into the hands of 
terrorist organizations.191  Relying solely on technological innovation makes a very short 
development and production cycle necessary if one wants to maintain an advantage of 
any sort; in other words, it creates an arms race.  Arms racing becomes difficult to sustain 
as nations resources are spent supporting the war effort in other manners.   
The argument that militaries will adapt to and cope with new technology can be 
extended to military doctrine, operations and tactics as well.  However, a well-designed 
military organization will allow much innovation, both in operations and tactics as well 
as in technology.  Continual innovation is what is necessary to stay inside an opponent’s 
OODA loop. 
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 
It is characteristic of the nature of newsworthy events that the introduction of the 
Stealth bomber and Tomahawk missiles receive so much more public attention than the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act that allowed these weapons to be used more effectively by the 
American military.  According to James R. Locher III, the American military encourages 
a bottom-up mentality, and often focuses on and is more receptive to technological 
innovation than organizational innovation.192  However in this thesis, of the two case 
studies concerning the American military in the chapter on both technological and 
organizational innovation, both approaches towards innovation were utilized.  
Nevertheless, technological innovation is easier to understand, visualize and market than 
organizational innovation.  One possible cause of the resistance to organizational 
innovation could be the poor definition of organizational innovation; the term is applied 
to every change in the status quo, including “new cafeteria food,” as Joyce Wycoff 
sarcastically comments.193  Perhaps the military is an environment that is resistant to 
change, as many critics such as Anthony C. E. Quainton and James Adams charge.194  
Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan claim that senior leaders often have emotional 
attachments to projects and programs that they created or that allowed them to excel and 
are reluctant to see them go.195  It is natural that stakeholders should be somewhat 
attached to pet projects and programs.   
The solution is not to criticize the leadership and label them dinosaurs or 
retrograde thinkers.  The solution is to foster an environment where others are 
encouraged to pursue and develop ideas.  The French military command during the 
interwar period of the 1920’s and 1930’s was notoriously bad at this.  Charles de Gaulle 
had to seek protection from a senior officer to salvage his career after publishing a book 
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that outlined his ideas for an armored division and cast doubt onto the wisdom of the 
French doctrine a the time.  However, the German military encouraged unconventional 
thinkers such as “Hammerin’ Heinz” Guderian even if said thinkers clashed with 
conventional authority.196  
When writing about military effectiveness and about dramatic battles, more focus 
is placed on tactics and operations than on the organizational changes that allowed these 
new tactics and operations to be fully developed.  However, behind every major tactical 
and operational change was a dramatic organizational change: either a turn-over of 
leadership, a new branch forming, division or subdivision of current military structures or 
the recognition of a new role for a certain branch of the military. 
Organizational innovation allows new thinkers to rise to the top and establish the 
basis for new doctrine, operations and tactics—the foundations of a successful 
operational military.  Organizational innovation is remarkably underrated as a tool for 
military effectiveness.  Most militaries seem forced into organizational innovation by the 
desperation of their situations or lack of funding for technological innovation to 
conventionally oppose their adversaries.  Mao Zedong advocated the people’s war only 
until he had enough political, military and financial force to create a standing army and 
force a decisive battle with the then Chinese government.  He wanted to reject his own 
organizational innovation that had proven to be successful and adopt a more conventional 
organization when the Red Army had enough power to do so.197   
This unfortunate trend of organizational innovators desiring to adopt more 
conventional organizational structures ignores the fact that most purely organizational 
innovations have been rather successful, or more successful than most purely 
technological innovations.  Perhaps this resistance to organizational innovation occurs 
precisely because most purely organizational innovations have been forced upon 
militaries: change or suffer unacceptable consequences.  For example, only when Great 
Britain was in danger of starving due to U-boat activity during WWI was the Admiralty 
forced to reorganize itself and accept convoying.  The Boer Commandoes had little 
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choice in their new organization after their conventional military leadership surrendered 
to the British in the Boer War.  Since the former organization allowed the situation to 
deteriorate to such dire circumstances, almost any change is positive.  However, poorly 
advised changes, such as the French artillery during the Franco-Prussian War, can have 
catastrophic effects on a military. 
The lesson to be learned is that organizational innovation can be remarkably 
successful and allow for many new ideas: both technological and operational.  It should 
be encouraged, as opposed to something that is fiercely resisted. 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
The combination of organizational and technological innovation can be the most 
effective form of innovation there is.  By surprising the opponent with both new 
technology and new organization, the opponent will become disoriented and will suffer 
considerable damage reacting to the new and unexpected change in his opponent.  By 
massive innovation, one can create the shorter decision loop advocated by John Boyd. 
By opting for both untested organization and technology, a military is risking 
quite a lot.  The torpedo boats of the French Jeune École were an embarrassment to the 
French navy when it was discovered that the boats had incredibly limited ranges.  Much 
less could they sneak up undetected and destroy much larger battleships.  However, the 
new German armored divisions combined with Panzers created an incredibly successful 
campaign for the German military in the beginning of WWII.  Opposing militaries felt 
overwhelmed by the perceived technological superiority of the German army, when in 
fact there existed only 10 Panzer divisions.  This thin modernization became transparent 
as the German armies lost more tanks over the course of the war than could be replaced 
and German forces found themselves overextended.  However, the German army’s risky 
innovations created remarkable dividends in their invasion of Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands. 
Allan Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth Watman pose several questions in 
determining military effectiveness, which include: “to what degree are the military’s 
strategic objectives consistent with their … technical base” and “to what extent are a 
military organization’s operational concepts and decisions consistent with available 
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technology”.198  They are emphasizing that militaries must have compatible 
technological and organizational systems.  If the weapon systems developed and acquired 
by a military cannot be effectively used by the current organization, then the military will 
not reach its full potential.  Likewise, if the organization creates the need for weapons 
that are not available, it too, is doomed to failure.  This could be why the Jeune École 
failed: their concept of operations required technology that was not feasible or available 
at the time it was tried.  By simplifying and ignoring the importance that advanced 
technology was to play in their new organization, the vision of a smaller, more agile navy 
was doomed.  Granted, technology and organization do not always advance at the exactly 
the same rate, and simultaneously developing the two is an elusive goal.  However, an 
attainable goal is for new technology and new organization to be developed with 
consideration towards each other. 
Sometimes militaries advance technologically first, creating new technology and 
then considering new ways of employing the technology: new tactics, new operations and 
new strategy. Eventually new technology via the new strategy creates a demand for 
organizational innovation to become fully effective.  This bottom-up approach is popular 
in many militaries.  For example, at the Battle of Jutland, radio was available on board 
vessels.  However, the torpedomen (electricians) and not the signalmen were responsible 
for radio operations and even officers specializing in signaling were not trained in use of 
the radio.199  Because of this, radio use was sporadic at best and largely ineffective.  
Eventually the organization caught up with the new technology to employ the radio more 
effectively in future wars.  One example of a military successfully innovating 
technologically and then organizationally is the German U-boats during WWII.  The U-
boats were designed and developed during the interwar period, and then wolf-pack 
organization and tactics were experimented with in the first year of the submarine 
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campaign.  Admiral Dönitz eventually consolidated the U-boat command into a 
centralized organization, with U-boats controlled from headquarters in Lorient.200   
At other times, organizational innovation comes first, and technology is required 
to follow.  The Marine Corps amphibious doctrine is a successful example of this.  
Marine Corps leadership had recognized the need for an amphibious capability in the 
early 1920’s and established the Fleet Marine Force to focus on the development of the 
doctrine, organization and tactics.  It could be said that the development of amphibious 
doctrine was a top-down approach towards technological and organizational innovation.  
First the need for the amphibious capability was recognized, and then the organization 
reshaped itself to allow for doctrinal development.  The numerous amphibious and fleet 
experiments allowed for operational and tactical development.  As war broke out across 
Europe, everything except the technology was in place for the new amphibious 
capabilities.  The maturation of embryonic landing craft, amphibious tanks (LUTS) and 
LSDs occupied the early war years.201  Much of the success of the island-hopping 
campaign is due to the fact that all aspects, both organizational and technological fell into 
place just before the new amphibious capability was used for the first time. 
A far less successful example of this method of organizational and technological 
innovation was the French Jeune École.  Admiral Aube recognized a need to efficiently 
deal with the threat posed by the British Navy.  When he came to power, he effected 
organizational changes, ridding the French navy of its most senior leadership and trying 
to promote a class of younger, sea-going officers, as opposed to the current environment 
of senior leadership based on politics as opposed to war-fighting experience.  He then 
developed doctrine and operations for his fleet of torpedo boats and gunboats.  However, 
technology did not keep pace.  The necessary research and development of the vessels 
was never undertaken and the vessels were built “on the cheap”, which comprised the 
vessels even more than the simple lack of research and development.  The ultimate result 
was a fleet of unseaworthy vessels and an embarrassment to the French navy.  Also, he 
attempt at organizational innovation was half-hearted.  While he replaced much of the 
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leaderships, the new leaders filled the same roles as before.  There was no drastically new 
organizational structure that could foster the developments of Jeune École doctrine and 
technology.  Both technology and organization failed the Jeune École. 
E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The lesson to be learned from this thesis is that there is no ultimate weapon or 
ultimate organization that will successfully respond to every threat in the future.   
Organizations and technology have to be continually reshaped to meet the new threats as  
the future unfolds.  No new technology or organization will ever be the last weapon 
needed or the last organizational change made.  It was once claimed that the invention of 
nuclear weapons had obviated the need for any new military technological innovation.  
However, militaries have evolved and developed new technologies since.    
Once this is acknowledged, one can recognize that constant innovation, both 
technological and organizational, is required.  Militaries seeking innovation should not 
invest solely in technology, as this approach has been historically disappointing.  While 
organizational innovation has been more successful, it is often resisted by militaries 
themselves.  The most effective innovations are where technology and organization work 
in tandem.  Sometimes technology will unveil the need for new organization and other 
times new organizations will allow the development of new technology.  Each form of 
innovation should fuel the other, allowing militaries to advance and adapt to the times 
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